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Abstract
Assessing how well an individual can meet real world cognitive demands is an
important clinical outcome, particularly for older adults. Research examining real world
cognitive functioning has used both lab-based tasks as well as questionnaires. However, these
assessments were limited for a number of reasons. Lab-based tasks lack personal relevance
which may affect the strategies and amount of effort individuals apply, reducing their
ecological validity. Questionnaires are considered more ecologically valid but require
individuals to recall cognitive failures over weeks and months depending on an individual’s
fallible cognitive ability to remember their mistakes over long periods of time. More recent
research has attempted to develop methods for the daily reporting of cognitive failures but
focus primarily on memory failures and ignore more general types of cognitive failures.
These daily diary studies also failed to assess the impact of cognitive failures on daily
functioning. The current study built on this previous research and introduced a set of
assessment tools designed to capture missed activities, memory failures, and difficulties with
attention and concentration that individuals experience on a daily basis as well as the impact
of these events on daily functioning. One hundred thirty-one participants, 20 to 80 years old
completed these assessments once each day for a period of seven days as well as a series of
lab-based cognitive tasks. These data revealed that participants reported missing the most
activities due to overload (e.g., running out of time) but found missing activities due to
somatic complaints as the most bothersome. With regard to daily memory failures,
participants reported equal numbers of retrospective and prospective memory failures but
reported expecting more future consequences from prospective memory failures. Older
participants reported experiencing more missed activities and memory failures but rated these

events as less bothersome, less interfering, and as less likely to bring about future
consequences compared with younger adults. Daily failures of attention and concentration
were captured using a Likert-style scale that assesses cognitive interference. This
questionnaire exhibited adequate reliability and factor structure both between- and withinpersons and tapped a construct separable from negative affect. Finally, there was evidence of
weak relationships among self-reported cognitive failures and objective cognitive
performance. Findings are discussed relative to previous research on self-reported cognitive
failures, the importance of assessing other daily processes and their effects on daily cognitive
failures, and the continued lack of relationship between self-reported cognitive failures and
objective cognitive performance.
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DEVELOPMENT OF A DAILY DIARY METHOD FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF
EVERYDAY COGNITIVE FAILURES
Overview
The assessment of cognitive performance outside the lab is critical to understanding
an individual’s level of real world functioning and can be an important clinical outcome for
researchers interested in cognitive deficits related to illness and age. Impairment in everyday
cognitive functioning can result in significant consequences for the individual (e.g.,
forgetting to pay rent or not completing a work task on time). Although researchers have
used different approaches to index an individual’s ability to meet real world cognitive
demands, one approach is through the assessment of self-reported cognitive failures.
However, self-reports of everyday cognitive failures remain limited for several reasons. First,
self-reports of cognitive failures tend to focus on exclusively on memory failures and neglect
other aspects of cognitive functioning. Second these assessments typically do not capture the
impact of these failures on daily activities. Research that does examine the impact of
everyday cognitive failures restricts assessments to failures well outside the normal range of
functioning (e.g., problems with activities of daily living such as dressing). Consequently
these assessments lack sensitivity to the impairment related to failures in normally
functioning individuals. Third, many previous studies of everyday cognitive failures rely on
retrospective self-reports that span relatively long temporal response frames (e.g., 30 days),
which can reduce reporting accuracy and introduce bias (Cavanaugh, Feldman & Hertzog,
1998).
The overall objective of the proposed study is to develop a set of self-report tools for
the daily assessment of everyday cognitive failures in a population of normally functioning
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individuals. These new tools addressed the limitations of previous assessments in three ways.
First, they broadened the types of cognitive failures assessed beyond memory failures:
participants reported on any missed activities regardless of whether the reason for missing
the activity was cognitive. Second, it included items designed to quantify the extent to which
reported failures impact daily functioning in cognitively intact individuals. Third, it focused
on shortening the reporting time interval to failures that occurred over the previous day.
The proposed research used a daily diary design to assess the type, frequency and
impact of everyday cognitive failures in a sample of community residing adults (ages 20-80)
and addressed the following general aims. The first aim was to describe the frequency, type
(e.g., prospective memory, retrospective memory, and overload), and impact of missed
activities and everyday memory failures. Also, the first aim will examine the effects of age
on these variables. The second aim was to conduct a psychometric analysis of a Likert-style
questionnaire designed to measure lapses in attention and concentration; specifically, to
establish its validity and reliability at both the within-person and between-person levels. The
third aim was to investigate the relationships between self-reports of daily cognitive failures
and objective in-lab cognitive performance.
In the next section of this document I review the strengths and limitations of previous
approaches to assessing everyday cognitive functioning. The review begins with a brief
consideration of performance-based measures, followed by an in depth discussion of selfreport measures; the approach used in the current study. Finally, I address the specific aims
of the current study and discuss hypotheses relating to each. In the methods section, I
describe the design and measures of the research. I then describe the findings in the current
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study as well as possible interpretations and implications. The document will conclude with a
discussion of these findings and suggestions for future research based on the findings.
Significance of everyday cognitive functioning
Everyday cognitive functioning refers to an individual’s ability to meet the cognitive
demands they face in the real world. For example, successful completion of activities such as
balancing a checkbook, remembering to take medications, and finding one’s way to and from
the grocery store depend upon multiple cognitive functions, such as memory, planning, and
attention. Severe impairment in the ability to meet these demands is often used as a
diagnostic criterion for psychological disorders (e.g., depression; Burdick, Endick, &
Goldberg, 2005) and organic diseases (e.g., dementia; Rediess & Caine, 1996). An
individual’s failure to meet everyday cognitive demands may affect decisions about their
ability to live independently in old age (Royall et al., 2007) or following a traumatic head
injury (Sveen, Mongs, Roe, Sandvik, & Bautz-Holter, 2008). A common outcome in clinical
literature is impairment or improvement in activities of daily living; activities that require
cognitive processes to perform (e.g., balancing a checkbook). For example, recent lab-based
cognitive interventions examine improvement in completing activities of daily living,
focusing particularly on older adults (e.g., Jobe et al., 2001; Willis et al., 2006). Further,
older adults' complaints about impaired cognitive performance outside the lab are associated
with Alzheimer’s pathology and may be present before objective cognitive tests reflect any
impairment (Barnes, Schneider, Boyle, Bienias, & Bennett, 2006; van der Flier, 2004).
In addition to possibly signifying underlying neurological damage, impairment in
everyday cognitive functioning can have a range of personal consequences (Martin, 1983;
Farias et al., 2008) and are a significant concern of older adults (Reese & Cherry, 2004).
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Although few studies document the severity of these consequences, it is generally accepted
that forgetting to take a medication, failing to pay attention while driving, or getting lost in an
unfamiliar neighborhood can have a negative impact on an individual’s ability to function
(Cohen & Conway, 2008; Kruysse 1992; Reason, 1984). Kruysse (1992) attempted to make a
direct connection between everyday cognitive functioning and real-world consequences
using an event-contingent diary study of cognitive failures experienced while driving. He
found that 27% of the failures were made in situations that were considered moderately to
very dangerous and at least one error resulted in an actual collision. However, it is still
unclear is how often these lapses occur in other contexts and the impact on an individual’s
daily functioning. To better understand the normative frequency of these lapses, researchers
have used both performance-based and self-report approaches to index an individual’s level
of everyday cognitive functioning.
Approaches to measuring everyday cognitive functioning
The next section briefly describes performance-based approaches to assessing
everyday cognitive functioning. After this, the self-report approach is addressed in detail.
Performance-based measures of everyday cognitive functioning
One approach to measuring everyday cognitive functioning is through the use of
performance-based assessments in the lab. Allaire and Marsiske (1999; 2002) developed and
evaluated a battery of cognitive tasks that were based on traditional lab-based measures but
used stimuli related to medication adherence and food preparation. They demonstrated that
these measures had high reliability (α = .69-.88) and were significantly correlated with their
traditional lab-based analogs (rs = .26-.74). Additionally, this battery predicted real world
outcomes such as self-reported performance on activities of daily living (Allaire & Marsiske,
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2002) and mortality (Weatherbee & Allaire, 2008) in a sample of older adults. Consistent
with lab-based research using more traditional cognitive performance measures, older adults
showed significant deficits in performance on this battery (Allaire & Marsiske, 1999).
Another performance-based method presents individuals with real world cognitive
demands and asks them to describe how to complete or actually perform daily tasks (Allaire
& Marsiske, 2002; Berg, Strough, Calderone, Sansone, & Weir, 1998; Diehl, Willis, &
Schaie, 1995). The participant-generated solutions are coded for quantity and quality. Allaire
and Marsiske (2002) found that the quality of the solutions significantly predicted selfreports of everyday functioning. Similarly, Allaire and Willis (2006) demonstrated that lower
scores on their open-ended measure of everyday cognitive functioning predicted cognitive
impairment as well as mortality even after accounting for age and education. As with the
battery of performance-based measures designed by Allaire and Marsiske (1999), scores on
these assessments decrease significantly with increasing age (for a review see Thornton &
Dumke, 2005).
Limitations of performance-based measures
The results of studies on performance-based measures of everyday cognitive
functioning suggest that these measures are psychometrically sound and useful for predicting
real world outcomes. However, an important limitation of the performance-based approach is
the lack of ecological validity. Tasks used in performance-based measures are not personally
relevant which may affect the effort or strategies the individual applies to the task. Previous
research indicates that individuals use more effective strategies for completing cognitive
tasks when the tasks are higher in personal incentives (Klehe & Anderson, 2007; Meacham
& Singer, 1977). Additionally, performance-based tasks require tightly controlled conditions
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that do not necessarily mirror real world experiences (Farias et al., 2008). In using these tasks
researchers minimize the variability in performance by eliminating distractions that are a
common part of an individual’s natural environment (e.g., cell phone) and controlling the
strategies that individual can apply to the task. Some researchers have argued that measures
administered in such controlled settings tend to assess an individual’s optimal level of
performance rather than their average or typical level of performance (Cronbach, 1970). This
implies that behavior captured in the lab does not necessarily reflect the full range of
functioning that exists in the real world (Smyth & Stone, 2003); this is an idea acknowledged
in other areas of research (e.g., industrial-organizational psychology; Klehe & Anderson,
2007) that may be particularly applicable to cognitive aging. That is, as the performance of
older adults becomes more variable with progressing age, in lab, or optimal, performance
may be less indicative of average, or daily, levels of functioning (e.g., Hultsch, MacDonald,
& Dixon, 2002).
Another limitation of performance-based measures is that they are generally not
suited for repeated administration over brief periods of time. If researchers are interested in
day-to-day variability in everyday cognitive failures, the factors that may affect performance
at this level, and the conditions under which failures occur, intensive daily measurements are
necessary (Borsboom, Mellenbergh, & van Heerden, 2003; Molenaar, 2008). Performancebased measures often require a trained research assistant to obtain valid scores (Conway et
al., 2005) and asking individuals to repeatedly return to a lab over a short period of time is
expensive and burdensome for both researchers and participants. Additionally, repeated
appointments interrupt a participant’s daily life and may impact performance on these
measures in unknown ways. Some attempts have been made to allow participants to self-
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administer performance-based tasks in their homes (e.g., Allaire & Marsiske, 2005), but this
approach raises questions about the validity of scores (e.g., unsupervised participants may
cheat or complete tasks incorrectly). Performance-based tasks are also susceptible to practice
effects, particularly when administered over short periods of time (Allaire & Marsiske, 2005;
Rabbitt, Diggle, Smith, Holland, & McInnes, 2001).
These limitations suggest that performance-based measures of everyday cognitive
functioning may not generalize to real-world functioning and may make it difficult to tease
apart practice effects from day-to-day variability in functioning caused by other processes.
Because of these limitations, the second approach is to have participants report on their
ability to meet everyday cognitive demands. These self-report measures tend to focus on the
cognitive failures individuals make while attempting to meet everyday cognitive demands.
Self-report measures of everyday cognitive failures
Most, if not all, individuals have experienced cognitive mishaps that affected their
ability to complete daily tasks (Martin, 1983; Reason, 1979). Everyday cognitive failures can
involve forgetting important information, lapses in attention and concentration, or forgetting
to complete a started task. Research on cognitive failures suggests that memory failures tend
to be the most often reported, although there is some disagreement over which type of
memory failure is most prevalent (i.e., retrospective or prospective; Herrmann & Neisser,
1978; Terry, 1988). Research has found that failures are most likely to occur when the
individual is experiencing emotions high in arousal (Yamanaka, 2003) and during the
transition between home and work (Reason, 1984; Yamanaka, 2003). In contrast to
performance-based research on everyday cognitive functioning, there is less evidence of age
differences in self-reported cognitive failures (Crawford, Smith, Maylor, Della Sala, &
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Logie, 2003; Hertzog, Park, Morrell, & Martin, 2000; Reese & Cherry, 2006) However, other
information regarding the nature and causes of daily cognitive failures is scarce. For
example, do memory failures occur more often for information that is recently learned or
well known? Theories and lab-based studies of memory suggest memory failures for recently
learned information should occur more often (Craik, 1994) but it is unclear whether this
applies to everyday memory failures. Most research has focused on the frequency of failures
in general, rather than on the specific characteristics of the failures. One purpose of the
current study is to gather more detailed information on self-reported everyday cognitive
failures individuals.
Self-report methods can be further sub-divided into two categories: global and daily
diary assessments. In this context, the term "global assessments" refers to assessments that
ask the individual to report failures over weeks or months, or to report their experiences with
cognitive failures 'in general.' Daily diary assessments encompasses two different
approaches. Event-contingent assessments ask participants to keep a log of the failures they
experience as they experience them, whereas time- or signal-contingent assessments require
participants to report on as many failures as they can after receiving a signal (or at a
particular time of day), as in the current study. The next section describes global assessments
of everyday cognitive failures.
Global assessments of everyday cognitive failures
A number of existing global assessments ask about the frequency of different types of
failures (e.g., attention and concentration: Thought Occurrence Questionnaire [TOQ];
Sarason, Sarason, Keefe, Hayes, & Shearin, 1986, processing speed: Subjective Cognitive
Complaints Questionnaire [SCCQ]; Newson & Kemps, 2006, activities of daily living:
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Spector & Fleishman, 1998) over a range of reporting intervals. The total number of failures
is thought to indicate an individual’s level of everyday cognitive functioning. Some of these
questionnaires ask individuals to report how often they believe they experience these failures
in general. For example, Johannson, Allen-Burge, and Zarit (1997) asked individuals for
ratings of their perception of their cognitive function overall (e.g., on the whole, do you think
that you have problems remembering things you want to do or say?).
Other questionnaires focus on more specific time periods that can vary depending on
the types of failures of interest. Researchers typically attempt to specify a time period that
allows an adequate number of opportunities for individuals to experience a cognitive failure.
For example, asking individuals to report on the number of missed appointments over a short
period of time may result in no reported failures not because the individual kept all their
appointments, but because they had no appointments to keep (Hannon, Adams, Harrington,
Fries-Dias, & Gipson, 1995). This is in contrast to failures such as misplacing items and
word-finding difficulties, which may be more frequent in daily life. The differences in the
assumed baseline probability of real world activities has led to questionnaires that assess
failures over weeks (Troyer & Rich, 2002) and months (Roche, Fleming & Shum, 2002), or
the extent to which they experience this failure 'in general' to allow ample opportunities for
individuals to experience the failures of interest.
Construct validity of global assessments.
Evidence for the construct validity of questionnaire measures of cognitive functioning
comes from the relationship between these questionnaires and lab-based measures of
cognitive performance. For example, Manly, Robertson, Galloway, and Hawkins (1999)
found that individuals with higher scores on the Cognitive Failures Questionnaire
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(Broadbent, Cooper, Fitzgerald, & Parkes, 1982) made significantly more errors on a
Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART; Robertson, Manly, Andrade, Baddeley, &
Yiend, 1997), relative to individuals with lower scores. Likewise, Hertzog and colleagues
(Hertzog et al., 2000) found small but significant correlations between their measures of
retrospective memory and the Frequency of Forgetting subscale of the Memory Functioning
Questionnaire (Zelinski, Gilewski, & Anthony-Bergstone, 1990).
Royall and colleagues (Royall, Palmer, Chiodo, & Polk, 2005) have found some of
the strongest relationships among questionnaires and lab-based performance using that their
measure of instrumental activities of daily living (IADLs). Self-reported difficulty with daily
activities was significantly associated with performance on list memory (r = .50) and an
executive functioning task (r = -.48). It is important to note that the relationships in this study
may be inflated given the advanced age (Mage = 77.9) and impairment (<30% lived
independently) of the sample. Additionally, while the measure of IADLs in this study was a
self-report scale, it was administered by a trained interviewer rather than as a selfadministered paper-and-pencil measure. The introduction of a trained interviewer may have
improved the quality of participant reports.
A second source of evidence for the validity of questionnaire-based assessments is
that scores on these measures are related to actual neurological impairment. Recent research
has found that smaller hippocampi were related to more reports of memory failures
(Striepens et al., 2010; van der Flier et al., 2004). Additionally, individuals with brain
pathology consistent with Alzheimer's disease report more failures compared with
individuals without this brain pathology despite scores that correspond to unimpaired
functioning on typical objective measures of cognitive performance (van der Flier et al.,
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2004). These questionnaires also differentiate between patient groups and normal controls.
For example, patients with head trauma (Sterr, Herron, Hayward, & Montaldi, 2006),
dementia (Johansson, Allen-Burge, & Zarit, 1997), and depression (Wagle, Berrios, & Ho,
1999) report significantly more cognitive failures compared to age-matched controls.
Similarly, Peres et al. (2006) found that older adults with mild cognitive impairment reported
significantly more difficulties with IADLs compared to normal functioning older adults
(though still significantly fewer than those diagnosed with dementia).
Cognitive interference as a form of cognitive failure.
Researchers have also extended the definition of "cognitive failures" to include lapses
in attention and concentration. Using this liberal definition, assessment of cognitive failures
then includes "cognitive interference," or an individual’s experience of unwanted or intrusive
thoughts and their attempts to control these thoughts (Sarason, Pierce, & Sarason, 1996;
Wegner & Zanakos, 1994). Cognitive interference is similar to rumination or worry, and is
associated with the psychiatric symptoms of depression, generalized anxiety, and posttraumatic stress disorder (see Sarason, Pierce, & Sarason, 1996 for a review). However,
unlike these constructs -- which tend to focus on recurrent negatively-valenced emotional
content (e.g., depressive rumination) -- cognitive interference refers to any unwanted
thought. Cognitive interference represents a form of cognitive failure by itself; an inability to
focus one’s thoughts on the task at hand. Additionally, using limited mental resources to
suppress an unwanted thought may cause distraction from the current task. While some
cognitive failures questionnaires contain items that assess attentional failures (e.g., SCCQ;
Newson & Kemps, 2006) measures of cognitive interference focus exclusively on these
failures. Cognitive interference questionnaires also assess attempts to control intrusive
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thoughts which may influence cognitive performance through the consumption of mental
resources. Cognitive failures questionnaires tend not to assess attempts at thought control at
all, possibly disregarding an important source of cognitive failures.
Global assessments of cognitive interference.
Cognitive interference questionnaires focus on two aspects of unwanted thoughts.
First is the frequency of unwanted thoughts. For example, the Thought Occurrence
Questionnaire (TOQ; Sarason, et al., 1986) asks how often an individual experiences
thoughts unrelated to their current task. Second is how often the individual attempts to
control unwanted thoughts. The Thought Control Questionnaire (TCQ; Wells & Davies,
1994) asks individuals how often they try to replace an unwanted thought with other taskrelated thoughts. Experiencing and controlling unwanted thoughts likely consumes cognitive
resources that could be used to meet daily cognitive demands.
Like the cognitive failures questionnaires described above, these assessments can
vary with regard to the time interval under consideration, though many tend to focus on what
individuals generally do (e.g., White Bear Suppression Inventory; Wegner & Zanakos, 1994;
TCQ; Wells & Davies, 1994). More recent research has introduced a questionnaire that
focuses on briefer time intervals (i.e., “Today, during this session”) to assess day-to-day
variability in cognitive interference within an individual (Stawski, Mogle, & Sliwinski, in
review). One aim of the current study is to examine the psychometric properties of an
extension of this measure and its ability to differentiate both between individuals as well as
within an individual across different days.
Construct validity of cognitive interference questionnaires.
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Because cognitive interference is intended to act as an index of an individual’s ability
to focus their attention, key evidence for the validity of these questionnaires as measures of
cognitive functioning comes from their relationship to attentionally demanding cognitive
tasks. For instance, Stawski and colleagues (Stawski, Sliwinski, & Smyth, 2006)
demonstrated that individuals reporting more cognitive interference had significantly slower
reaction times on a working memory task. Kane et al. (2007) also found that individuals with
lower working memory ability reported more off-task thinking during the day, relative to
those with higher working memory ability.
Similarly, McVay and Kane (2009) found that individuals were significantly more
likely to make mistakes on a go-no go task on trials when they also reported experiencing a
task-unrelated thought. This finding implies that when the attentional demands of a task are
high, experiencing an unwanted thought can impair performance. In support of this
interpretation, Friedman and Miyake (2004) showed that, compared with individuals who
were more susceptible to proactive interference, individuals who were better able to resist
proactive interference reported lower levels of unwanted intrusive thoughts. Whether daily
self-reported cognitive interference is related to other types of in-lab cognitive tasks remains
unclear. An aim of the current study is to examine the relationship of these questionnaires to
a broader set of cognitive abilities.
One additional piece of evidence for the validity of these measures comes from the
finding that individuals with disorders that impair attention report experiencing more
cognitive interference. Weyandt and Dupaul (2006) found that college students with a history
of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) report experiencing significantly more
intrusive thoughts compared to students without these histories. This implies that individuals
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with reduced attentional resources experience more difficulties with cognitive interference,
strengthening the link between cognitive interference and the ability to attend and
concentrate.
Limitations of global assessments.
Despite the utility and validity of global assessments of cognitive failures, this
method has been criticized for a number of reasons. One primary limitation is that these
assessments may depend more on the individual’s perception of their cognitive functioning
rather than their actual functioning, because the measures require retrospection over long
intervals of time (Cavanaugh et al., 1998; Herrmann, 1982). Research suggests that
individuals rely on broad frameworks of beliefs to respond to items that require retrospection
over intervals longer than a few hours (Cavanaugh et al., 1998; Robinson & Clore, 2002).
These responses may be more related to an individual’s beliefs about themselves and their
abilities (e.g., self-efficacy) rather than their actual performance. Additionally, individuals
who experience many cognitive failures may have difficulty in actually recalling these
failures making questionnaire responses dependent on already fallible cognitive ability
(Gorin & Stone, 2001; Rabbitt & Abson, 1990).
A second self report method for assessing everyday cognitive failures is through daily
diary approaches. These methods attempt to circumvent one of the limitations of global
assessments by asking individuals to report failures over shorter periods of time. Eventcontingent reporting asks individuals to complete assessments regarding their failures as they
occur (or are noticed). This method and relevant findings are discussed next.
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Event-contingent method of assessing everyday cognitive failures
In studies using the event-contingent reporting method individuals keep a detailed
diary of their cognitive failures as they occur throughout the day. In these studies, individuals
report their cognitive failures as well as details regarding the time and place of the failure.
This additional information provides greater insight into when individuals are vulnerable to
cognitive failures. For example, Reason (1984) found that individuals were more likely to
report making cognitive errors during transitions between home and work (e.g., I forgot to
bring my wallet). Additionally, Yamanaka (2003) found that individuals reported most
cognitive failures when they were preoccupied or experiencing an emotion high in arousal
(regardless of valence). Event-contingent measures of cognitive failures add to our
understanding of failures as they occur in the real world. This approach may reduce reporting
biases by capturing failures as they occur, rather than relying on retrospective recall. As the
memorability of failures may depend on the type of failure (i.e., prospective or retrospective)
or the impact the failure has on daily functioning, asking participants to report on a failure
before they can forget it occurred is critical to getting an accurate portrayal of everyday
cognitive functioning.
Limitations of the event-contingent method.
One limitation of event-contingent reporting is that these reports may not reflect all of
the failures an individual experiences. First, individuals can choose which failures to report
and which to ignore, potentially affecting both the type and frequency of reported failures
(Morris, 1984). Individuals may choose to report those failures they see as minor to present
themselves as better at functioning outside the lab than they really are, leaving out failures
that have a greater impact on daily functioning. Second, individuals can only report a failure
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if they notice it. This limits reporting to those failures that are brought to the individual’s
attention (Rabbitt & Abson, 1990), which typically occurs through the experience of
consequences. Finally, individuals who are lower in cognitive ability may be more likely to
experience cognitive failures but less likely to notice them (Rabbitt & Abson, 1990). If the
individuals who make the most failures report the fewest failures, these reports would be
poor indicators of actual everyday cognitive functioning. That is, depending on a participant
with lower memory ability to self-initiate a report when they do notice a failure might place
too much responsibility on the participant and lead to incorrect conclusions about their ability
(if frequency of reported failures is used to index their cognitive performance). However, the
relationship between objective performance and event-contingent reports remains unclear, as
none of the available studies have examined the relationship between reports of failures
outside the lab and in-lab cognitive performance.
Although the event-contingent method could capture day-to-day fluctuations in
cognitive failures, most of the studies using this method have focused on describing daily
experiences of cognitive failures without investigating intraindividual variability.
Additionally, though event-contingent reports of failures may reduce some reporting biases,
they may introduce reactivity. That is, asking participants to report so frequently on failures
may actually change the way an individual approaches daily cognitive demands in order to
avoid making failures (and having to report them). Signal- and time-contingent daily
measures instead adapt global measures for daily assessments. These assessments provide
participants with examples of possible failures and ask whether they occurred throughout the
day. These examples act as probes and may assist participants in reporting failures that
occurred farther away in time from when the assessment is completed. Participants then only
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report on failures once a day, but are given some assistance in recalling their failures over
those few hours.
Signal-contingent method of assessing everyday cognitive failures
Neupert and colleagues (Neupert, Almeida, Mroczek, & Spiro, 2006a; 2006b;
Whitbourne, Neupert, & Lachman, 2008) adapted the CFQ (Broadbent et al., 1982) for an
intensive measurement study of everyday cognitive functioning. Individuals completed
revised forms of the CFQ each night for eight days. Researchers found significant
intraindividual variability in the reporting of cognitive failures and identified variables that
influenced reporting of cognitive failures within an individual. For example, individuals were
more likely to report cognitive failures on days when they also reported experiencing a
stressor (Neupert et al., 2006a; 2006b) compared with non-stressor days and less likely to
report cognitive failures on days they reported engaging in physical activity as opposed to
days when no physical activity is reported (Whitbourne et al., 2008).
By examining daily cognitive failures using this method, the aforementioned studies
were able to identify variables that reduced (i.e., physical activity) and increased (i.e., stress)
the likelihood of reporting of everyday cognitive failures. Consistent with other research on
self-reported cognitive failures (e.g., Hertzog et al., 2000), Whitbourne et al. discovered that
older adults were no more likely to report cognitive failures than younger adults. Whitbourne
et al. (2008) also found no relationship between their measure of cognitive ability and daily
reported failures, however, cognitive performance was assessed using a brief measure
administered via telephone (Tun & Lachman, 2006) rather than in the lab.
Limitations of signal-contingent method.
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The research by Neupert and colleagues (Neupert et al., 2006a; 2006b; Whitbourne,
Neupert, & Lachman, 2008) marks the first examination of the day-to-day variability and
within-person predictors of cognitive failures. However, the revised forms of the CFQ
continue to emphasize memory failures. Evidence from global and diary studies suggest that
memory failures are the most prevalent everyday cognitive failures (Reason, 1984;
Yamanaka, 2003), yet this may be due to biases in reporting. For instance, it is possible that
memory failures may be most noticeable, and therefore more often reported.
Another limitation is that no information regarding the emotional and practical
consequences of a particular cognitive failure was collected. Not assessing the consequences
of failures neglects the impact these failures are (or are not) having on an individual’s ability
to function. It may be that certain types of failures are reported frequently (e.g., prospective
memory failures) but these failures have little impact on the individual’s ability to meet
everyday cognitive demands. Conversely, failures reported less frequently (e.g., forgetting
someone’s name) may cause greater discomfort for the individual and have a greater impact
on their daily functioning. Finally, the relationship between daily measures of cognitive
failures and lab-based cognitive performance has yet to be investigated, which continues to
limit support for the construct validity of daily measures of cognitive failures.
Summary of introduction
Previous research examining everyday cognitive functioning has used both
performance-based and self-report measures in an attempt to capture an individual’s ability to
meet real world cognitive demands. Of these two approaches, self-report measures are more
common due to a perception that they are more ecologically valid and easier to use both
inside and outside the lab.
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There are two types of self-report methods that have been used to index cognitive
failures. Global assessments focus on the frequency of specific cognitive failures over
prolonged (i.e., weeks or months) time intervals. Event-contingent reports are diaries an
individual keeps of their cognitive failures over a brief period of time (e.g., a week).
Although studies using these different methods provide valuable information regarding
everyday cognitive failures, each method suffers from important limitations. Global
assessments have some evidence of construct validity but may be susceptible to retrospection
biases, as participants attempt to quantify their failures over long time intervals. Eventcontingent reports attempt to reduce retrospection biases by assessing failures as they occur,
but these lack evidence of construct validity and may rely too heavily on the participant to
notice (and remember to report) their failures.
More recent research has used end of day self reports which involve retrospecting
over much shorter periods of time. These end of day surveys assess specific examples of
cognitive failures taken from validated global assessments. The resulting measures (e.g.,
Neupert et al., 2006a; 2006b; Whitbourne et al., 2008) have been used to examine
intraindividual variability in everyday cognitive failures and provided evidence of
psychosocial variables that both increase and decrease the reporting of cognitive failures
within an individual. This marks an important step in the study of cognitive failures, as
previous research had not considered day-to-day fluctuations in everyday cognitive failures.
However, these measures remain limited in several ways. First, they continue to focus
primarily on memory failures. Second, the items on these questionnaires were highly specific
(e.g., forgetting the plot of a book) and may have limited the failures that participants could

Everyday cognitive failures 33
report. Finally, no research has examined the relationships between lab-based cognitive
performance and daily, self-reported cognitive failures.
The current study
The purpose of the current study was to extend previous research by validating an
assessment tool of cognitive failures in the context of a daily diary study. The assessment
used both rating scales and checklists of missed activities and memory failures to
characterize an individual’s everyday cognitive failures. The general goal of the current study
was to examine the properties of this assessment tool and its ability to capture the type,
frequency and impact of cognitive failures in the real world. Specifically, the current study
described the nature of everyday cognitive failures, explored the psychometric properties of
the daily diary measures where appropriate, and examined the relationship of daily cognitive
failures reported using this method to in-lab cognitive measures.
Measurements of cognitive failures designed for the current study were made up of
three different assessments. The first checklist asked participants for information regarding
incomplete daily activities, the reason the individual failed to complete these activities, as
well as follow up questions regarding the consequences they expect to experience from not
completing these activities. This is a novel approach to assessing cognitive failures, as it
allowed participants to report incomplete activities regardless of the reason for missing the
activity. Reasons for not completing activities were then subdivided into cognitive and noncognitive categories, discussed in detail in the Methods section. A second checklist focused
specifically on memory failures, and gathered additional information regarding the nature of
the information forgotten (i.e., recently learned vs. known for a while) and the perceived
consequences of the failure.
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The final set of items addressed problems related to attention and thought control by
assessing the extent to which an individual experiences and attempts to control intrusive or
unwanted thoughts. Intrusive thoughts and attempts to control these thoughts may distract
from current task performance. Because cognitive interference likely occurs frequently
throughout the day (Kane et al., 2007; Wegner & Zanakos, 1994), asking participants to
report on each separate occasion could create reactivity and induce unwanted thought
monitoring. That is, frequently asking individuals about their unwanted thoughts may
increase awareness of their thoughts and alter their responses to the questionnaire. To limit
reactivity, participants completed a series of items assessing the general frequency of
cognitive interference throughout the day. These assessments will provide a broader picture
of the cognitive failures a person experiences daily, including lapses in attention, failures
related to memory and missed activities.
Aims & Hypotheses
Aim 1
The first aim of the current study was to characterize the missed activities and
memory failures individuals reported experiencing. Missed activities were differentiated by
reason: those missed for cognitive reasons (i.e., overload, attention and concentration,
prospective memory) and those missed for non-cognitive reasons (i.e., somatic). Few
previous studies have collected detailed qualitative and quantitative information about missed
activities. The structure of the new assessment allowed an in-depth description of daily
missed activities including frequency of occurrence, concurrent impact (i.e., bothersomeness
and interference with daily schedule), and perceived future impact. To address the first aim, I
examined the frequency with which individuals reported failing to meet different demands
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for reasons related to cognitive functioning and somatic complaints. These missed activities
were further described by the immediate consequences, perceived future consequences and
the extent to which the unmet demand is part of the individual’s routine. With regard to
memory failures, I examined the frequency of the different types of memory failures as well
as the characteristics of the most frequently forgotten information (e.g., well-learned versus
novel information).
After characterizing everyday missed activities and memory failures, I addressed the
following specific hypotheses:
Hypotheses related to Aim 1.
Hypothesis 1. Previous research suggests that individuals will most frequently report
missing activities and memory failures related to prospective memory, that is, failure to
complete an intended action (Crawford et al., 2003; Terry, 1988). I hypothesized that
participants would report more prospective memory failures compared with retrospective
memory failures. I also compared these failures on their perceived impact on the individual's
daily life. It is possible that these failures do not differ in frequency but that prospective
memory failures have a greater perceived impact compared with other types of failures. To
illustrate, it is generally accepted that forgetting to take an important medication could have
greater consequences compared with forgetting the name of a friend (though perhaps not a
supervisor; McDaniel & Einstein, 2007).
Hypothesis 2. In-lab research and theorizing also suggests that individuals are more
likely to forget recently learned information compared with well known information (Craik,
1994). However, previous research on everyday cognitive failures has generally ignored the
distinction between recently and well-learned information. This information was collected in
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the current study: I hypothesized that individuals would report more memory failures for
recently learned information compared with well-learned information. Additionally, I
hypothesized that more cognitive failures would be reported for tasks that are atypical rather
than those that are usually part of the individual’s daily routine. I also compared these
failures on their associated impact ratings. It is possible that the impact of a failure depends
on the nature of missed activity or forgotten information.
Hypothesis 3. Finally, I examined relationship of age to the different types of
cognitive failures was examined. In their daily diary study, Whitbourne et al. (2008) found
no difference in the number of memory failures reported across their age groups (ages 2285). This is consistent with other research on self-reported cognitive failures (e.g., Hertzog et
al., 2000), but is contrary to lab-based research suggesting that older adults have diminished
cognitive ability compared with younger adults (see Hofer & Alwin, 2008). Given that the
current study uses self-report methods, I hypothesized older adults in the current study would
not report more cognitive failures compared with younger adults. Previous research also has
not examined whether the type of cognitive failure modifies the relationship between age and
self-reported everyday cognitive failures. For example, it is possible older adults would
report more memory failures for recently learned compared with well-known information. In
the current study, I examined whether the type of failure reported affected the relationship
between age and everyday cognitive failures. Similarly, given that the current study assesses
a broader range of failures (both within the category of memory failures and in general), it is
possible that previous research found no difference across age because of the limited range of
failures assessed. Finally, previous research has framed items for daily assessment in terms
of the mistakes that individuals make (e.g., did you fail to recognize, by sight, close relatives
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or friends, or fail to recognize famous people seen on TV or in photographs?). Endorsing
these items may have negative connotations as the participant must admit difficulty with
cognitive functioning. The current study instead asks participants to report on activities they
missed and then allowed them to select from a variety of reasons why they missed this
activity, not all of which are cognitive in nature. This format may encourage participants
(particularly older adults) to report events, as reporting does not necessarily imply difficulty
in functioning.
Additionally, I examined whether the perceived impact of failures depended on the
age of the participant. The socioemotional selectivity theory of aging suggests that as
individual, they shift their priorities away from cognitive to socioemotional goals
(Carstensen, 1995). This motivational shift implies that older adults should rate their
cognitive failures as lower in impact (i.e., less important) compared with younger adults.
Alternatively, some research indicates that older adults worry about their memory
deteriorating as this may lead to a loss of independence (Reese & Cherry, 2004). This implies
that older adults may rate their failures as higher in impact compared with younger adults.
Analyses in the current study examined these competing predictions.
Aim 2
A second aim was to conduct a formal psychometric validation of the cognitive
interference rating scale. The first two questions capture information about qualitatively
different cognitive failures making these items inappropriate for more traditional
psychometric analyses (e.g., reliability or factor analysis). In contrast, the cognitive
interference scale consists of nine separate rating scale items designed to assess a single
construct reflecting one’s ability to focus attention, maintain concentration, and avoid being
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distracted by unwanted thoughts. The scale was designed to tap both processes encompassed
by cognitive interference: experience of intrusive thoughts as well as the suppression of those
thoughts. Before using this scale to quantify cognitive interference it was important to
determine that it measured a single reliable construct both between- as well as withinindividuals. The repeated nature of the assessments in the current study allowed an
examination of the scale’s properties at both levels. As noted earlier, little research to date
has examined the within-person fluctuations in cognitive interference (Kane et al., 2007;
Stawski et al., in review) making this a necessary first step before using this measure in
additional analyses.
Hypotheses related to Aim 2.
Hypothesis 4. I predicted that reliable interindividual and intraindividual variability
would exist in cognitive interference. Acceptable between-person reliability would indicate
that the scale is appropriate for differentiating between individuals while acceptable withinperson reliability would indicate that the scale is appropriate for differentiating different
types of days (e.g., high vs. low stress) within an individual. I tested whether there is reliable
variance at both the between- and within-person levels using generalizabilty theory (cf.
Cranford et al. 2006).
Hypothesis 5. Additionally, the hypothesized factor structure was examined using a
multi-level factor analysis to determine whether the scale appeared to assess a single,
coherent factor at both the between- and within-person levels. I hypothesized that a onefactor solution would best fit the data at both levels.
Given that two distinct functions comprise cognitive interference (i.e., experience of
intrusions and attempts to control these intrusions; Wegner & Zanakos, 1994), it is possible
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that a two factor solution appropriately describes the data from the measure developed in the
current study. Other self-report measures of cognitive interference are specifically designed
to measure these two processes (e.g., Impact of Events Scale, Horowitz, Wilner, & Alvarez,
1978; White Bear Suppression Inventory, Wegner & Zanakos, 1994). If a one-factor solution
did not fit the data, I was prepared to use a two factor solution with items addressing each of
these aspects of cognitive interference.
Hypothesis 6. Finally, to establish the discriminant validity of the cognitive
interference scale, I examined the relationship between cognitive interference and negative
affect. Cognitive interference is similar to rumination, a construct related to depression and
negative affect (Moberly & Watkins, 2008; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). It is therefore important
to examine the between- and within-person relationships between the cognitive interference
and negative affect questionnaires to determine that these were assessing separate constructs
at both levels. The original version of the cognitive interference questionnaire was found to
measure a construct separable from negative affect (Stawski et al., in review) and I
hypothesized that this would apply to the extended version used in the current study.
Aim 3
The third aim was to investigate the relationships of everyday cognitive failures,
cognitive interference and individual differences in objective cognitive performance in the
lab. Self-report measures of everyday cognitive failures were designed to serve as an index of
actual cognitive ability and should be related to objective cognitive performance in the lab.
The nature of the questions allowed a more in-depth examination of the differential
relationships between self-reported cognitive failures and objective cognitive performance.
For example, cognitive failures related to activities that are not part of an individual’s routine
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may show differential relations to cognitive tasks compared to failures for more familiar
activities. Similarly, memory failures for recently learned information may be more related to
working memory ability, while failures related to well known information might show
stronger relationships with episodic memory. However, previous research on cognitive
failures has not made these distinctions when examining the relationships between cognitive
failures and objective performance.
Previous research has suggested that cognitive interference (i.e., failures of attention
and concentration) is significantly related to working memory ability using global reports of
cognitive interference (Klein & Boals, 2001; Stawski et al., 2006). I will test whether this is
true of daily reports of cognitive interference and whether cognitive interference is related to
any of the other cognitive abilities assessed in the current study.
Hypotheses related to Aim 3.
Hypothesis 7. I tested the specific and general relationships among the different
assessments of cognitive functioning used in the present study. For example, I examined the
relationships of the specific types of failures are related to performance on specific cognitive
tasks (e.g., retrospective memory failures and episodic memory performance). Previous
research has found that the relationship between lab-based performance and self-reported of
cognitive failures is strongest when these assessments tap similar abilities (e.g., prospective
memory; Hertzog et al., 2000). However, this relationship has not been tested with a broader
range of cognitive failures. Additionally, no study has looked at the relationship between
daily diary reports of everyday cognitive failures and in-lab cognitive performance.
Hypothesis 8. I examined the impact of temporal proximity of the assessments on the
relationships among cognitive failures and objective cognitive performance. That is, it is
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possible that assessments of cognitive failures completed closer in time to administration of
the cognitive measures may be more related to in-lab cognitive performance compared to
those completed farther away in time.
Hypothesis 9. I tested the relationship between working memory ability and daily
reports of cognitive interference. I hypothesized that objective tests of working memory will
be significantly related to self-reports of cognitive interference (c.f. Stawski et al., 2006). I
also investigated the relationship of cognitive interference to a broader range of cognitive
abilities.
Hypothesis 10. Similar to hypothesis 8, I examined the influence of temporal
proximity of the assessments on the relationships between cognitive interference and
objective cognitive performance. That is, assessments of cognitive interference completed
closer in time to administration of the cognitive measures may be more related to cognitive
performance compared to those completed farther away in time.
Method
Design
The current study used a variety of lab-based measures, as well as palmtop
computers, to collect information regarding an individual’s cognitive performance in and out
of the lab. During in-lab sessions, participants completed a number of paper-and-pencil
measures assessing personality and affect as well as a battery of computerized exercises
examining objective cognitive performance. Outside the lab using the palmtop computers,
participants filled out reports of everyday cognitive functioning (i.e., missed activities,
memory failures and cognitive interference) and other daily experiences such as stressful
events, physical symptoms, sleep quality, and affect while in their usual environments. Data
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for the current study were collected as part of a larger project and only a subset of the
measures were used in the present analyses.
Participants
One hundred and eighty-eight individuals expressed interest in the current study.
Participants were recruited through a number of different methods: 101 were referred to the
study from other current participants (53.7%), 48 were participants in previous studies
conducted by our lab (25.5%), 11 received a letter about the study (5.5%), 9 saw an ad on the
electronic billboard Craig’s List (4.5%), 6 saw a flyer posted in a public place (3.2%), 2 were
recruited via emails (1%), 10 saw an ad in the local Pennysaver newspaper (6.5%) and one
person had no referral data. Recruitment materials appear in Appendix A. Of the 188
individuals that were initially screened in the pre-study, 131 were included in the final
dataset for analysis. I describe throughout this section how and why individuals were
excluded from the final dataset. In summary, of the 188 individuals that participated in the
prescreening study 22 were not eligible, 12 were not interested in continuing, 14 did not
complete the longer study despite being eligible and interested, 4 did not return their palm
pilots, and 5 completed the 7-day study but did not complete the primary measure of interest
(the cognitive failures questionnaire).
The final sample included 131 participants with an average age of 48.53 (SD = 15.86)
and 55.7% of the sample was female. On average, the current sample had a little more than a
high school education (M = 13.5 years, SD = 2.69) and 39.5% were employed at the time of
participation. The race breakdown is similar to the population from which the sample was
selected (Upstate New York) with the majority of the participants being Caucasian (54.2%)
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followed by individuals identifying as Black (35.1%). The remaining participants were of
Hispanic (4.6%), or other (6.1%).
Procedure
The current study consisted of two parts. Participants initially completed a prescreening study. Participants that adequately completed the pre-screening study (as defined
below) were invited to participate in the Full study.
Pre-screening study
Individuals interested in the study received detailed information regarding the
commitment related to participating and the general goals of the research. Those who
expressed interest, were in the proper age range (i.e., 20-80 years old), spoke fluent English
and woke up after 4am but before 11am were invited to participate in the initial pre-screening
study. The telephone screening questionnaire can be found in Appendix B.
The pre-screening study was a brief version of the full study and included 2 in-lab
sessions and 2 days of ecological momentary assessment (described below). The first session
included the consent process, a demographics questionnaire (see Appendix C) and training in
the use of the palmtop computer for the daily assessments. For 2 consecutive days following
this initial session, participants completed the daily assessments. Participants returned the
palmtop computer within 4-5 days of the first session. At this appointment, participants were
thanked for their time and effort and compensated for returning the palm pilot. All
participants also heard a description of the second part of the study and were asked whether
they were interested in the second part of the study if they were determined to be eligible. Of
the 188 participants who completed the pre-screening study, 173 (92%) indicated they would
be interested in participating in the second part.
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Inclusion criteria.
Participants who correctly completed at least one morning survey, one evening
survey, and 6 of 10 beeped surveys were invited to complete the second part of the study. To
be considered correctly completed, beeped surveys had to be started within 30 minutes of the
scheduled beep and could last no longer than 30 minutes from start to finish. Of the 173
individuals who participated in the pre-study and expressed interest in the 7-day study, 153
(88.4%) were eligible for the full study and 140 of these individuals attempted to participate
in the 7-day study.
Full study
In lab protocol.
The procedure for the full study included 2 in-lab sessions and 7 days of daily
palmtop computer assessments. During the first in-lab session, participants received refresher
training with the palmtop computers to ensure familiarity with the daily assessment protocol.
At this session, which lasted one and a half hours, they also completed a series of
questionnaires assessing personality, health behaviors, stressful events, perceived stress, trait
cognitive interference, and social support. Details of the questionnaires used in the current
study are described in the measures section and all questionnaires can be found in Appendix
D.
On the day following the first session of the full study, participants began completing
daily assessments using the palmtop computer and these daily assessments continued through
the next 7 days. Eight to ten days after the first session, participants returned for their second
session which lasted approximately 2.5 hours. During this session, compliance with the daily
assessment protocol was reviewed for compensation purposes. Participants also completed a
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battery of cognitive tasks and health measures. The health measures included blood pressure,
body fat analysis, hip-waist ratio, height, weight, and glycated hemoglobin (percent HbA1c);
these measures are not used in the proposed analyses for the current study. The cognitive
measures in the current study included measures of processing speed, working memory,
crystallized intelligence, mental set switching, and episodic memory. The order for
administration of these tasks was constant across all participants. Cognitive tasks were
administered in the following order: Object Match, Trails, Auditory Verbal Learning Test,
Spatial Span, Letter-Number Sequencing, Letter Match, Spatial Memory, Number Match,
Subtract 2 Span, Shipley Vocabulary, Symbol Search, Backward Letter Span, Letter Series,
and Paired Associates. Task procedures for those tasks used in the current study are
described in the measures section below, and descriptions and example problems for all tasks
can be found in Appendix E.
Ecological momentary assessment protocol.
Participants received a palmtop computer that they were asked to carry for seven
consecutive days. Each day participants completed up to seven assessments: a morning
assessment, an evening assessment, and 5 prompted assessments (beeped assessments).
Participants completed the morning assessment as soon as they woke (morning assessment)
and the evening assessment just prior to going to bed (evening assessment). Participants were
not told when the prompted assessments would occur, as these are scheduled for pseudorandom times spaced approximately 2-3 hours apart throughout the day. At recruitment
participants provided a normal waking time and this time was used to assign a suitable
schedule of beeped assessments during the participant’s waking hours. The different possible
beep schedules appear in Appendix F. The measures completed during these assessments and
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analyzed in the current study are described in the Measures section. All assessment
information appears in Appendices G and H.
Measures
Ecological momentary assessment measures
Everyday cognitive functioning.
Full details of these questions are provided in Appendix G.
Incomplete activities and memory failures checklists. Participants completed these
measures at the evening assessment. Using a checklist format, they indicated any activities
they did not complete that day and reported why they did not complete these tasks
(incomplete activities checklist). Participants were able to select as many activities as they
wished, and were asked to provide reasons for why they did not complete each task they
selected. Reasons an activity may have been missed included “ran out of time,” “couldn’t
concentrate,” and “too tired.” In addition, participants provided a rating of both the
immediate (i.e., how much does not completing [selected activity] bother you now? and how
much did not completing [selected activity] interfere with your daily routine?) and future
(i.e., do you think not [selected activity] will have consequences beyond today?)
consequences associated with not completing the selected task. All ratings were made on a
scale from 1-7 (1 = not at all to 7 = very much). For any incomplete activity, participants also
indicated whether that activity is part of their regular routine.
A second checklist asked specifically about items the individual forgot that day
(memory failures checklist). The individual indicated the type of information forgotten and
the impact forgetting had on their daily routine. Like the missed activities checklist,
participants rated the immediate and future consequences of the failure. and whether the
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forgotten information was part of their routine (i.e., taking medicine, an errand, household
chore, appointment) or was well known (i.e., important information, directions, personal
date, name). If the individual indicated they experienced no memory failures that day, they
filled out a brief questionnaire on the strategies they use for improving their memory (e.g.,
how often they wrote things down that day). This was done to encourage participants to
report memory failures as reporting no failures did not allow them to finish the question more
quickly.
Incomplete activities and memory failures reported in these two questions were
placed in one of five categories: retrospective memory, prospective memory, attentional
demands, overload, and somatic. All but activities missed due to somatic complaints were
considered cognitive failures. Retrospective memory failures included memory failures for
“directions,” “a name,” “where you put something,” “important information,” or “personal
date.” Prospective memory failures included the categories “taking medicine,” “an errand,”
“household chore,” or “an appointment” as well as uncompleted activities reported as “forgot
to start it” and “started, but forgot to finish.” Attentional demand failures were activities
missed because the participant “couldn’t concentrate.” Overload demand failures included
failures due to “ran out of time,” “it was too difficult,” “decided to avoid it,” “was
interrupted,” and “something more important came up.” Somatic-related failures included
“not feeling well” and “too tired.” (Also see Table 6 for a summary of how failures were
categorized as well as frequencies with which each category was reported.)
Cognitive interference. At the evening assessment, participants reported the extent to
which they experienced cognitive interference during the day. Using an extended version of
the questionnaire developed by Stawski et al. (in review), participants rated on a scale from
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1-7 (1 = not at all, 7 = very often) the number of times they experienced unwanted thoughts
and made attempts to control these thoughts. The stem for these questions was “today, how
often did you” and sample ends include “think about personal worries,” “have thoughts that
kept jumping into your head,” and “try to avoid certain thoughts.” The full questionnaire is
provided in Appendix G.
Daily psychosocial assessments.
Throughout the seven day period participants also reported on their experience of
stressors, affect, physical symptoms, and sleep quality. All items are provided in Appendix H
and brief descriptions of those analyzed in the current study are offered below.
Stress. At the beeped surveys, participants reported on any stressors they had
experienced since their last assessment. They provided qualitative information on each
stressor (e.g., an argument, work stress) as well as quantitative information (e.g., the extent to
which this event upset them). If a participant reported not experiencing a stressor they
completed another series of questions regarding why they believed they did not experience a
stressor. These questions were designed to encourage participants to report their stressful
events as not reporting a stressor would not allow them to complete the assessment more
quickly.
Affect. At each of the beeped assessments, participants completed two measures of
affect to indicate how they had felt since the last assessment. First a series of 4 items
presented rating scales with opposing emotions (e.g., stressed v. relaxed) and asked
participants to decide which emotion better characterized their feelings. Following this a
series of 8 adjectives were presented and participants rated how much each adjective
characterized their emotions on a scale from 1 (i.e., not at all) to 7 (i.e., extremely).
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The reporting interval for affect differed for each of the assessment types. For the
morning assessment, participants were asked to report on how they expected they would feel
that day. At the beeped assessments they were asked about their current state. In the evening
assessment, they were asked to report how they had felt throughout the day (i.e., in general
during the day).
Lab-based cognitive tasks
Participants completed a number of lab-based cognitive tasks assessing a variety of
cognitive constructs. Descriptions of cognitive tasks used in the current analyses appear
below. Screen shots and descriptions of all cognitive tasks are included in Appendix E.
Episodic memory.
Participants completed 3 measures of episodic memory: the auditory verbal learning
test (AVLT; Rey, 1964), a version of the paired associates subtest from the Wechsler
Memory Scale (WMS; Wechsler, 1997a) and a spatial memory task.
Auditory verbal learning test. Participants studied a list of 15 words for one minute.
At the end of the minute, they were given one minute to recall all the words they can
remember. The dependent measure is the number of correctly recalled words in one minute.
Paired associates. Participants saw a list of 8 word-number pairs. Then the word
from each pair was presented and the participant recalled the number that was paired with it.
There were four trials in this task for a total of 32 responses. The dependent measure is the
total number of correctly recalled numbers over all four trials.
Spatial memory. Participants saw a playing card presented in one of four different
locations on the screen. After a series of cards presented in different locations, participants
were shown a playing card and asked to click the location that playing card appeared. Each
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trial included 6 cards and participants completed 4 trials. The dependent measure is the total
cards correctly matched to their locations.
Working memory.
Participants completed 3 measures of working memory: a backward letter span
(Waters & Caplan, 2002), a subtract 2 task (Waters & Caplan, 2002), and a letter-number
sequencing task (Wechsler, 1997a).
Backward letter span. Participants saw a series of letters presented one at a time for 1
second each. At the end of each series participants recalled all of the letters they saw in
reverse order. The number of letters in each series varied from 3-7 and participants attempted
2 trials at each length. The dependent measure is the total number of the items for trials that
were perfectly recalled.
Subtract 2 span. Participants saw a series of numbers presented one at a time for 1
second each. At the end of each series participants recalled all of the numbers they saw after
subtracting 2 from each. The number of digits in each series varied from 3-7 and participants
attempted 2 trials at each of those lengths. The dependent measure is the total number of the
items for trials that were perfectly recalled.
Letter-number sequencing (LNS). Participants were read a series of letters and
numbers in a random (pre-determined) order. They then recalled all the numbers in numerical
order and followed by the letters in alphabetical order. The number of items in each set
ranges from 2 to 8 and participants attempted 3 trials at each length. The dependent measure
is the number of trials that were perfectly recalled.
Inductive reasoning.
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Participants completed two measures of inductive reasoning: Ravens matrices
(Raven, 1976) and a letter series completion task.
Letter series completion. Participants were provided with a number of letter strings.
Each of these letter strings followed a pattern and the participant selected the next letter in
the pattern from the options provided. The dependent measure is the total number of items
correctly answered in 6 minutes with a possible total of 30.
Ravens matrices. Participants saw an image with a piece missing or set of images
with one missing. Participants were provided with a set of possible options and selected the
piece that best completed the image or set of images. Participants completed the oddnumbered items only. The dependent measure is the total number of items correctly answered
out of a possible 30.
Lab-based psychosocial measures
Participants completed a number of questionnaire measures including assessments of
personality and demographic characteristics. All questionnaires are included in Appendices C
and D. The questionnaires were administered in the following order: Medical History and
Health Behaviors, Perceived Stress Scale, Thought Occurrence Questionnaire, Self-Efficacy,
Impact of Events Scale, White Bear Suppression Inventory, Social Support, Life Events
Checklist, Thought Control Questionnaire, Health Survey Short Form, Personality Scale, and
Center for Epidemiological Studies-Depression Scale. Only the subset of these
questionnaires used in the analyses of the current study are described below. All
questionnaires appear in Appendices C and D.
Demographics. Participants completed a measure assessing general demographic
characteristics including age, gender, education, income, and race.
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Personality. Participants completed a measure of personality based on items from the
International Personality Item Pool (Goldberg et al., 2006). The items in this pool were
developed to tap the Big Five personality characteristics: neuroticism, extraversion,
agreeableness, openness to experience, and conscientiousness. Cronbach's alphas in the
current study were .83, .64, .67, .76, and .76 for these subscales, respectively.
Thought Control questionnaire. The original scale contained 30 items asking about
the strategies individuals typically use to control their intrusive thoughts when they
experience one. The current study focused on two of the subscales of the original
questionnaire: worry and punishment. Strategies were rated on a 4-point scale from never to
almost always. Sample items included “I punish myself for thinking the thought” and “I keep
myself busy.” The reported total scale reliability is α = .77 (Wells & Davies, 1994) and the
reliability coefficients for the subscales in the current study were α = .83 for the worry
subscale and α = .73 for the punishment subscale.
Thought Occurrence questionnaire. Participants completed 28 items assessing the
types of thoughts they have while “they have to concentrate on something.” For example, “I
think about how poorly I am doing” and “I think about friends.” There was a 5-point
response scale from never to very often. Previous research found a Cronbach’s alpha of .93
(Sarason et al., 1986) and the alpha was .73 in the current study.
White Bear Suppression inventory. This scale consisted of 15 items designed to assess
the experience of intrusive thoughts and what the individual does to control these thoughts.
Items included “I wish I could stop thinking about certain things” and “I often do things to
distract myself from my thoughts” and responses were made on a 5-point scale from strongly
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disagree to strongly agree. Reliability estimates ranged from .87 to .89 in previous studies
(Wegner & Zanakos, 1994) and was .92 in the current study.
Impact of Events scale. Participants reported on the most stressful event of their life
along with details such as whether they received counseling for this event and whether the
event is continuing to cause them stress. After providing details of the event, participants
completed a 15-item rating scale assessing the extent to which they thought about this
stressful event in the past week. Sample items included “I thought about it when I didn’t
mean to” and “I tried not to talk about it.” Responses to the rating scale questions were made
on a 4-point scale from not at all to often. Previous research found adequate reliability for the
rating scale portion of the questionnaire (Cronbach’s α = .86; Horowitz, Wilner, & Alvarez,
1979), a finding replicated in the current study (Cronbach’s α = .89).
Data preparation
Final sample
One hundred and forty individuals were eligible and interested in the 7-day study
following completion of the pre-study. Of these individuals, 4 never returned their palm
pilots, 3 experienced hardware failures, and 2 returned their palm pilots but had not
completed any of the evening surveys thus providing no data primary measure of interest: the
cognitive failures questionnaires. This led to the inclusion of 131 individuals in the final
dataset.

Ecological Momentary Assessment data
Prior to conducting any analyses designed to address the study aims, participant
compliance and any missing data patterns were examined. First, I determined whether any
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assessments were not compliant with the study protocol. Specifically, participants were
instructed to complete the evening survey once each evening within an hour of going to bed.
In the current sample of 131 participants, there were 917 possible assessments (1 assessment
per day for 7 days times 131 participants). Of the possible assessments, participants
completed 833 assessments and 758 (91%) were considered compliant for use in the analyses
in the current study. In cases where participants completed more than 1 survey for a given
day, the first completed survey was used (n = 29). Additionally, assessments completed
between midnight and 4am on a particular day were assumed to refer to the previous day’s
events. Those assessments completed after 4am (but before 8pm) were excluded due to their
proximity to morning and beeped assessments on the following day (n = 33). After removing
noncompliant assessments, participant compliance was calculated by dividing the number of
surveys correctly completed by 7. Average participant compliance was 82.7% (~5.8 surveys).
Table 1 includes the breakdown of actual evening assessment completion. More than 80% of
the participants completed 5 or more of the surveys correctly over the seven day period.
Compliance was also assessed for beeped assessments to determine which would be
included in the confirmatory factor analytic models in Aim 2. Participants were instructed to
complete a beeped survey at five pseudo-random times per day. Assessments completed
within 15 minutes of the scheduled time were considered compliant with the beeped protocol.
There were a total of 4,585 beeped assessments possible over the entire sample and a total of
4,302 beeped assessments were completed. Of these assessments, 226 were outside the 15
minute time window. An additional 32 were eliminated because they were completed after
the participant’s seven day study period had ended. (Palm pilots continued to beep and some
participants continued to do surveys even though the seven days had ended.) As with the
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evening survey, in cases where participants completed 2 assessments for the same beep the
first of those surveys was included in the final data analysis. This led to the elimination of
another 336 assessments. On average participants completed 80.8% of the beeped
assessments correctly and the full breakdown of beeped compliance is available in Table 2.
In the current sample, 102 of the 131 participants correctly completed 70% or more of the
beeped assessments indicating good overall compliance with the study protocol.
Missing Data Analyses
Because of the amount of missing data in the current study, it was important to
determine whether the data were 1) missing completely at random, 2) missing at random, or
3) non-ignorable missingness. If the data are missing completely at random (MCAR) this
would indicate that there is no underlying relationship between the missing values and other
variables (observed or not). This is the best case scenario as the missing data are independent
of both predictors and outcomes and will not bias analyses. The second possible case is that
data are missing at random (MAR). In this case, the missing values are not completely
independent of all variables but can be predicted by observed variables within the dataset.
This would imply that although missing values are related to informative variables, those
variables were observed and can be used to control for the pattern of missingness in the
dataset. Finally, informative missing implies that missing values are dependent on some
unobserved variable or variables. Although it is not possible to rule the possibility of
informative missingness, it is possible to determine whether any of the observed variables are
related to the pattern of missing data. If missing values are dependent on person-level
characteristics measured in the current study, these characteristics can be included in
predictive models as covariates to control for any spurious relationships driven by
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systematically missing values and reduce bias in the estimates due to non-participation (Little
& Rubin, 1987).
The first step in assessing missing data patterns was to determine whether missing
values were related to any of the demographic, personality, or cognitive variables at the
between-person level. Spearman correlations were calculated among these variables and
compliance for both the beeped and evening surveys (Table 3) and generally evidenced weak
relationships. There was no consistent pattern of relationship between the cognitive variables
and compliance. Number of evening surveys completed was marginally associated with
episodic memory ability (r = .17, p = .06). On the other hand, better compliance with the
beeped surveys was significantly though weakly related to higher fluid intelligence ability (r
= .19, p = .03). With regard to personality, compliance with the protocol for both surveys
showed small but significant correlations with measures of trait cognitive interference (r's = .17 to -.26); those individuals reporting less propensity to experience intrusive thoughts were
more compliant with survey schedule. Lastly, compliance with both surveys showed small
positive correlations with age (r's = .18 and .20) implying that older adults completed more
surveys correctly.
The second step used to examine missing data patterns was to determine whether any
day-level characteristics (i.e., within-person variables) influenced the completion of a
particular evening survey. Non-linear logistic mixed models used day in study, day of week,
daily self-reported stressful events, and daily self-reported affect to predict the probability of
completing the evening survey. Prior to conducting analyses it was important to determine
whether the likelihood that a participant would complete the evening survey changed as the
study progressed or was affected by other variables observed in the current study. For
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example, it is possible that participants would be less likely to respond on high stress days
compared with low stress days. This could bias results if participants systematically fail to
complete surveys depending on the characteristics of the day. Day in study significantly
predicted compliance with the evening protocol. Participants were less likely to complete the
evening assessment as the study progressed (F[6, 673] = 32.42, p < .0001) though the
difference in probability of completion was small (p[completion first day in study] = .91 v.
p[completion last day in study] = .88). Conversely, participants were more likely to complete
the evening assessment on days when they reported experiencing higher than average
positive affect (PA; F[1, 912] = 5.28, p = .022; p[completion on days with 1 point higher PA]
= .90 v. p[completion on days with 1 point lower PA] = .88) and on days when they reported
at least one stressor (F[1, 912] = 8.36, p = .004; p[completion on stress days] = .93 v.
p[completion on no stress days] = .86). Day of week and negative affect had no effect on
probability of completing the evening assessment (p’s > .16).
Finally, before addressing the primary aims of the study, I examined the correlations
among personality, self-reported cognitive failures, and the perceived impact of these
failures. This was done to determine whether any personality variables appeared to affect the
reporting of failures and the perceived severity of their impact. Previous research has found
that personality traits such as neuroticism can affect the number of physical symptoms
reported (Larsen & Kasimatis, 1991) as well as the severity of discomfort associated with
these symptoms. Additionally, previous research has found positive correlations (r's = .28 to
.43) between neuroticism and cognitive failures (Broadbent et al., 1982; Merckelbach, Muris,
Nijman, & de Jong, 1996; Wallace, 2004). A similar trend appeared in the current data:
neuroticism was positively correlated with frequency of failures as well as with their
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perceived impact (Table 4). No other personality characteristics were consistently related to
both frequency and impact. Because neuroticism did appear to have an effect on the reporting
of failures and their impact, I controlled for neuroticism in all models comparing frequency
and impact across the different categories of missed activities and memory failures.
Results
The primary purpose of the current study was to design assessment tools for the
measurement of missed activities, memory failures, and cognitive interference suitable for
administration in a daily diary study. In the following section, I will discuss analyses that
evaluate and validate these daily measures in an sample of adults aged 20 to 80. The first aim
examined the frequency and impact of several types of missed activities and memory failures
and whether the frequency of these missed activities and memory failures depended on
typicality of the activity or forgotten information or the age of the participant. Aim 2
examined the psychometric properties of a Likert-style measure of failures related to
attentional control. Finally, Aim 3 focused on the relationship between the daily measure of
self-reported cognitive failures and performance on traditional lab-based cognitive tasks. The
first aim discussed describes the frequency of different failures as well as their perceived
impact in detail.
Aim 1
These analyses focused on the two checklists that participants completed assessing
incomplete activities and memory failures. Incomplete activities were subdivided into
categories addressing both cognitive failures and non-cognitive failures. The memory failures
were broken down into failures for intended actions (prospective memory) and for previously
learned information (retrospective memory). Before addressing the primary hypotheses for
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aim 1, I began by comparing the frequencies of incomplete activities and the frequencies of
memory failures across categories. Following these analyses, I then compared the impact
ratings across categories separately for each of these items. Finally, I pooled all of the
information provided in these items to compare the relative frequencies and impact of missed
activities and memory failures.
Frequency of Incomplete Activities and Memory Failures
Incomplete activities
The data analyzed for this aim were gathered using the incomplete activities checklist
described in Appendix G. This item asked whether there were any activities the participant
wished to complete that day that they were unable to accomplish. There were 7 different
activities the participant could report missing as well as an “other” category for events that
could not be otherwise classified. Participants reported at least one missed activity on over
50% of evening surveys (n = 430 of 833). On 34.6% of measurement occasions participants
reported one missed activity, 2 missed activities 12.7% of measurement occasions, 3 missed
activities on 2.6% of occasions and 4 or more missed activities on the remaining 1.7% (n =
14) occasions.
The breakdown of reporting for each of the different activities is reported in Table 5.
For any activity endorsed, the participant also indicated why they did not complete the
activity and these reasons were divided into four superordinate categories. Table 6 includes
the frequency with which each different reason was selected as well as the overall frequency
of the associated category. Activities missed for “other reasons” could not be classified into
the different failures categories and were excluded from further analysis (n = 103; 16.43%).
This should be differentiated from “other” activities that were missed. Missed activities
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indicated as “other” could be included if the participant indicated a reason that fit in one of
the categories. Because of the low frequency of attention failures (n = 11) reported in this
item, these failures were excluded from analyses and frequencies were compared across the
remaining three categories: overload, prospective memory, and somatic.
The main purpose of aim 1 was to determine whether there were significant
differences in the frequency and impact of reported failures across the three categories. To
test for differences among the different types of failures, I fit non-linear mixed models (SAS
Proc Glimmix) to compare the frequencies of failures across the three most frequent
categories of failures—overload, PM and somatic failures. Because these were counts of the
number of failures over the seven days of the study, the underlying distribution was modeled
using Poisson regression. Model fit was evaluated using the ratio of the Pearson Chi-Square
to degrees of freedom. There is no widely accepted rule of thumb for this statistic,
researchers generally agree that values closer to 1 and under 2 indicate adequate
representation of the underlying distribution. In cases where a Poisson distribution did not
appear to model the distribution appropriately, a negative binomial was fit to the data to
determine whether this distribution resulted in better model fit. Unless otherwise noted, the
Poisson distribution was used to model the distribution. For these models, effect sizes are
reported as risk ratios (RR) which reflect the risk of a particular event relative to another
event (e.g., the risk of an overload failure relative to the risk of a somatic failure).
Before fitting the first model comparing frequencies, I determined that differences in
responding rates were significantly related to the frequency of reported failures. This effect
suggested that individuals who responded least to the evening surveys also tended to report
fewer failures (F[5, 650] = 8.24, p < .01). (This may suggest bias as forgetting to complete
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the evening survey may be considered a cognitive failure.) Because of this relationship, the
response variables (i.e., the number of failures in the different categories) were corrected for
frequency of reporting by estimating the number of failures an individual would have
reported had they completed all 7 days of assessments based on their rate of failures on the
days they actually completed the surveys. For example, an individual who reported 2 failures
over the five days of assessment would be adjusted to 2.8 to estimate the rate of failures had
they responded to all of the assessments as directed. It is important to note this correction
does make the assumption that the likelihood of a failure would be constant over the duration
of the study and across individuals with different response rates.
Following correction of the outcome variable, I began by fitting a model to compare
the frequency of failures across the three categories. This model compared the frequencies of
missed activities due to prospective memory, overload, and somatic reasons. There was a
significant effect of category (F[2, 256] = 96.2, p < .01). Missed activities due to overload
were reported significantly more frequently than missed activities for other reasons. Model
estimated counts indicated that participants reported 2 missed activities due to overload
compared with less than one activities due to somatic reasons over the seven day period (RR
= 1.93).
Memory failures
Similar to the incomplete activities item, I began analyses of the memory failures
checklist item by examining the frequency of the different types of daily forgetting. There
were nine different items participants could indicate they had forgotten during that day as
well as an “other” category for a forgotten item that could not be otherwise classified.
Participants reported 358 forgotten items over the course of the study. On 23.9% (n = 199) of
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measurement occasions participants reported at least 1 memory failure; 2 memory failures on
7.7% of occasions (n = 64), and 3 or more memory failures on the remaining 1.2% (n = 10).
Items in this question were classified into two types of memory failures. Table 7 details the
number of failures for each type of information as well as the overall frequencies of the
superordinate categories. Because "other" items could not be classified as retrospective or
prospective, they were treated as a separate category in these analyses (n = 49; 13.7%).
As with the incomplete activities question, I began by comparing the frequencies of
prospective memory, retrospective memory, and unclassified memory failures using
nonlinear mixed models. There was a significant effect of type of memory failure on
reporting frequency (F[2, 256] = 33.04, p < .01). The frequency of reporting for prospective
memory and retrospective memory failures was not significantly different (p = .13) but both
of these memory failures were reported more frequently than unclassified memory failures
(p’s < .01; RRs = 2.96 and 3.49 respectively).
Impact of incomplete activities and memory failures
For each of the missed activities and memory failures reported, participants also rated
the extent to which missing that activity or forgetting the item bothered them, the degree to
which the event interfered with their daily schedule and whether they anticipated
experiencing future consequences. The means for these ratings broken down by type of
missed activity as well as reason and overall category appear in Table 6 and the same data
appear in Table 7 for memory failures. Because some participants reported more than 1 event
in a given category on a given day, two different means were calculated for each rating. For
the mean and standard deviation in column labeled 'Mean-A' the average of these two ratings
was taken to calculate the overall category mean while in column labeled 'Mean-M' the

Everyday cognitive failures 63
maximum of the two ratings was taken to calculate the overall category mean. The
differences between these two calculations of the mean were small and for analyses
comparing these ratings across categories the first mean (using the average of the two
ratings) was used. For these analyses, effect sizes were calculated using Cohen's d. For this
measure of effect size, effects ranging from .2 to .5 represent small effects, .5 to .8 medium
effects, and greater than .8 large effects.
Incomplete activities.
Because the rating scales were continuous, multilevel linear mixed models (SAS Proc
Mixed) were fit to determine whether a particular type of missed activity was rated as more
bothersome than the others, creates more perceived interference in an individual’s daily
activities, or is associated with greater future consequences. Omnibus tests indicated there
was no significant difference among the three categories of missed activities in how bothered
people were (p = .16), how interfering the missed activities were (p = .09) or perceived future
consequences (p = .73). These findings imply that although missed activities due to overload
were the most commonly reported incomplete activity, they were not rated as more irritating,
interfering or having more future consequences than the other types of missed activities.
Memory failures.
Models were also fit to the three impact ratings to determine whether these ratings
were significantly different across the memory failures. For bothersome-ness ratings, the
effect of category was significant, F(2, 64) = 6.45, p < .01 and specific contrasts indicated
that prospective and retrospective memory ratings did not differ in their ratings (p = .93)
though both were significantly higher than ratings of bothersome-ness for unclassified
memory failures (p’s < .01, d = 0.87 and 0.89 respectively). Conversely, there was not a
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significant difference across the types on their interference ratings (p = .37). Finally, with
respect to anticipation of future consequences, there were significant differences across the
categories (F[2, 64] = 5.4, p < .01). Prospective memory failures were rated as having
significantly greater future consequences than retrospective memory failures (p = .002, d =
0.82). Unclassified memory and prospective memory failures were not significantly different
though the contrast was marginal (p = .076, d = 0.58) and there was no difference between
retrospective and unclassified memory failures (p = .34, d = 0.31).
All incomplete activities and memory failures
Finally, I combined the information from both the incomplete activities and memory
failures checklists to compare the frequencies of memory and other more general cognitive
failures (e.g., overload failures). For these analyses, I created a global index of prospective
memory failures by adding the failures reported in the incomplete activities checklist with
those reported in the memory failures checklist. This was the only category that included
information from both cognitive failures questions. I then compared the frequencies of
reported failures and the impact of these failures across four categories: overload, somatic,
retrospective memory, and prospective memory.
Comparing frequencies across all failures.
As with the initial frequency analyses, I used a nonlinear mixed model to compare the
frequency of failures across the four categories. There were significant differences across the
categories, F(3, 384) = 8.27, p < .01, missed activities due to overload were reported more
frequently than all other categories. The other categories (somatic, retrospective, and
prospective) did not differ from one another (p's > .55). Risk ratios for missed activities due

Everyday cognitive failures 65
to overload compared with the other categories were 2.28, 2.05, and 2.02 for somatic,
retrospective, and prospective memory, respectively.
Comparing impact across all failures.
I then compared the impact indices across the four categories to determine whether
there were any differences in the ratings of bothersome-ness, interference or anticipation of
future consequences. There was no significant difference across these categories on the
ratings of bothersome-ness (p = .68). There were differences across the categories on both
interference (F[3, 145] = 2.85, p = .04) and future consequences (F[3, 145] = 4.34, p = .006).
With respect to interference ratings, somatic failures were rated significantly more interfering
than both retrospective memory failures (d = 0.55) and prospective memory failures (d =
.40). Additionally, overload failures were rated as more interfering than retrospective
memory failures (d = 0.34). For the ratings of future consequences, overload and prospective
memory failures were perceived as having significantly greater future consequences than
retrospective memory failures (d's = 0.68 and 1.02, respectively).
Taken together these analyses imply that while missed activities due to overload are
the most frequently reported, they are not considered more bothersome than other types of
failures. Additionally, though the frequency of the somatic, prospective and retrospective
memory categories were not significantly different from one another they do appear to have
different perceived levels of impact on an individual's life. Missed activities due to somatic
complaints are rated as more interfering than either of the memory failure categories.
Following this broad examination of the frequency and impact of the different
categories of missed activities and memory failures, I proceeded to the hypotheses outlined
as part of Aim 1. The hypotheses associated with Aim 1 were designed to examine specific
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differences in frequencies or impact of missed activities and memory failures and whether
characteristics of the categories (e.g., routine vs. novel) or the individual (e.g., age) affect
their frequency or impact.
Hypotheses related to aim 1
Hypothesis 1.
Previous research on self-reported memory failures indicated that failures related to
completing an intended action were most frequent (Crawford et al., 2003; Terry, 1988). To
examine this I compared the frequency of self-reported prospective memory failures to the
frequency of self-reported retrospective memory failures. For this comparison I used the
overall index of prospective memory failures that included failures reported for incomplete
activities as well as those reported in the memory failures question. There was no significant
difference between the reporting frequencies of these two categories (p = .49) but there was a
significant difference in the impact ratings for these two categories (p < .01). Prospective
memory failures were rated significantly higher in anticipated future consequences compared
with retrospective memory failures (d = 0.82). While the reporting frequencies of these two
different types of failures did not differ significantly, it appears that they do differ in their
impact on daily functioning. The differences found by previous research (Crawford et al.,
2003; Terry, 1988) may indicate that prospective memory failures are believed to be more
frequent by participants because they have a greater impact on their daily activities.
Hypothesis 2.
The second hypothesis focused on the specific characteristics of memory failures and
how these might affect reporting of cognitive failures. Research suggests that individuals are
more likely to forget recently learned information compared with well known information
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(Craik, 1994). In the current study, participants indicated whether or not the retrospective
memory failure was for a recently learned or well-known item and identified the incomplete
activities as part of their daily routine. To address the second hypothesis, I fit nonlinear
mixed models separately to compare the rates of failures within a particular category to
determine whether routine (or well-known) or not (recently learned) were more frequently
reported. Risk ratios for this section are reported using non-routine activities (or recently
learned information) as the reference. Ratios greater than 1 suggest that failures for routine
activities are more likely while ratios below 1 suggest failures for non-routine activities were
more likely. Table 8 includes all the relative frequencies and impact ratings for failures
broken down by typicality.
Comparing frequencies across failures depending on typicality.
Retrospective memory failures. The first category I examined was retrospective
memory failures for well-known compared with recently learned information. It is important
to note that these analyses exclude the most frequently reported retrospective memory item:
where I put something. Participants were not queried about the length of time they knew this
information and while it could be assumed that this is a recently learned (or at least recently
encoded) piece of information, it is possible that these failures represent a mixture of time
periods (e.g., I forgot where I left the vacuum after I used it last week v. I forgot where I set
my sunglasses down today). For this reason, I chose to exclude them from these analyses. As
noted above, I used a nonlinear mixed model to compare the probability of reporting a wellknown opposed to a recently learned retrospective memory item. Contrary to expectations,
failures for well-known information were more frequent than failures for recently learned
information (F[1, 128] = 3.8, p = .05; RR = 1.75).
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Missed activities due to overload, prospective memory, and somatic complaints. I
then compared the probability of failures for routine and not routine activities for each of the
other categories of failures. There was a significant difference in the frequency of missed
activities due to overload with significantly more failures reported for non-routine activities
compared to routine activities, F(1, 128) = 19.62, p < .01, RR = 0.61. On the other hand,
participants reported missing more routine activities for both the somatic (F[1, 128] = 4.62, p
= .03, RR = 1.38) and prospective memory categories (F[1, 128] = 9.89, p < .01; RR = 1.58,
respectively). One possible explanation for these results is that more routine prospective
memory and somatic activities are, by definition, attempted frequently and this would
provide more opportunities for missing these types of activities.
Comparing impact across failures depending on typicality.
Retrospective memory failures. I also examined whether the characteristics of the
reported failures affected the ratings of irritation, interference or anticipation of future
consequences provided by participants. The only significant effect was for ratings of
interference; memory failures for recently learned information were more interfering than
failures for well-known information (F[1, 9] = 7.75, p = .02, d = 3.16).
Missed activities due to overload, prospective memory, and somatic complaints. For
the irritation ratings, only routine and not routine activities missed for somatic reasons
received significantly different ratings with failures for routine activities causing greater
irritation than failures for non-routine activities (F[1, 19] = 4.33, p = .05, d = 0.35). Missing a
routine activity due to overload was more interfering than missing a non-routine activity
(F[1, 32] = 6.06, p = .02, d = 0.74). There were no significant differences on any of the
ratings of anticipated future consequences (all p's > .23). These findings indicate that missing
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routine activities may have a greater impact on participants' daily functioning compared with
missing non-routine activities.
These results imply that asking participants for information about the nature of the
failure could provide insight into which failures are perceived to create the most difficulties
in daily functioning. These characteristics may also affect the relationship between failures
and in-lab cognitive performance; a hypothesis that will be investigated further as part of
Aim 3.
Hypothesis 3.
Hypothesis 3 was designed to examine whether age affected the frequency of
reporting cognitive failures and the perceived impact of these failures when they were
reported. To examine this, a main effect of age and the interaction between age and category
of failure were added to the nonlinear mixed models comparing frequencies across the
different categories of failures. When there was a significant age effect in these models I
compared age groups by examining the estimated outcomes for adults one standard deviation
below the mean age of the sample (from hereafter referred to as younger adults) and
estimated outcomes for adults one standard deviation above the mean of the sample
(hereafter referred to as older adults). Risk ratios were calculated using younger adults as the
reference group (i.e., denominator). Risk ratios above 1 then indicate greater risk for older
adults, while ratios under 1 indicate greater risk for younger adults.
Comparing frequencies of incomplete activities across age. As with the initial models
fit at the beginning of Aim 1, I began by comparing the frequency of failures from the
incomplete activities items. This involved comparing the frequency of missed activities due
to somatic, overload and prospective memory reasons across age. For this model, the main
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effect of age was not significant, however, the age by category interaction was significant
(F[2, 254] = 3.07, p = .048) indicating that age trajectories differed for each of the different
categories of incomplete activities. Both missed activities due to overload and somatic
complaints increased with age; older adults reported nearly twice as many missed activities
of these types compared with younger adults (RRs = 2.4 and 1.71, respectively). Missed
activities in the prospective memory category did not increase with age (RR = 0.76). This
finding is consistent with some research suggesting that older adults perform just as well as
younger adults on prospective memory tasks outside the lab (e.g., Dobbs & Rule, 1988).
Comparing frequencies of memory failures across age. I then compared the
retrospective, prospective, and general memory failures reported. For this model, the main
effect of age (F[1, 254] = 7.05, p = .01) and the age by category interaction were significant
(F[2, 254] = 6.38, p = .002) and indicated an age related increase in reporting of all types of
memory failures though this was most pronounced for retrospective memory failures (RR =
3.01). Prospective memory failures (RR = 1.6) and unclassified memory failures (RR = 1.25)
also showed increases with age which is consistent with lab-based research suggesting that
memory ability decreases with age across several different types of memory tasks (see Cohn,
Emrich, & Moscovitch, 2008 and Old & Naveh-Benjamin, 2008 for reviews). This is in
contrast to the research noted above indicating that older adults make fewer prospective
memory failures outside the lab.
One possible reason for these contradictory findings is that the items in the memory
failures checklist thought to reflect prospective memory failures actually captured both
prospective and retrospective memory failures. All prospective memory depends on
retrospective memory to some extent (McDaniel & Einstein, 2007). For example,
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remembering to go to the store to pick up milk can be seen as two memory tasks.
Remembering to go to the store to get something would be defined as the prospective
memory portion as it reflects the intention to perform an action. Recalling the item to be
picked up at the store (i.e., milk) is a retrospective memory task. The memory failures
checklist in the current study does not distinguish between the two components of these
activities. A participant reporting they forgot an errand could have forgotten to start the
errand (e.g., going to the store; a prospective memory failure) or forgotten the content of the
errand (e.g., what to pick up from the store; a retrospective memory failure). Older adults
may have more difficulty with the retrospective component causing them to report a failure
for that item even though it was classified as a prospective memory item in the current study.
These results suggest that older adults reported significantly more failures than
younger adults across most of the categories of failures in the current study (the only
exception being missed activities in the prospective memory category) and, in general, this
did not depend on whether the failure reflected a routine or non-routine activity. Possibly
more important than the frequency of failures is the impact individuals perceive these failures
to have on their daily life. Because of this I then added age and the age by category
interaction to the models comparing the ratings of irritation, interference, and anticipated
future consequences.
Comparing impact of incomplete activities across age. There were significant main
effects of age for the comparison of the incomplete activities (F[1, 48] = 9.76, p < .01) on
ratings of irritation. Older participants rated missed activities as less irritating than younger
participants (Table 9). There were no significant age effects when comparing the incomplete
activities categories on ratings of interference (p's > .11). For the ratings of future
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consequences there was a significant main effect of age (F[1, 48] = 9.22, p < .01) which
indicated that older adults rated missed activities as lower in future consequences compared
with their younger counterparts (Table 9).
Comparing impact of memory failures across age. There were no significant effects
of age on irritation ratings or perceived future consequences for memory failures (p's > .15).
For ratings of interference, the comparison of the interference ratings for failures from the
memory failures checklist was significant (F[1, 62] = 5.28, p = .03). Again older participants
rated their failures as less interfering than younger adults (Table 9).
I also compared the ratings of impact across the routine and non-routine categories to
determine whether these ratings were differentially affected by age however, there were no
significant age by category interactions for any of the models (all p's > .16; Table 10).
This is one way in which the method of reporting in the current study may help in
getting a better estimate of the cognitive failures older adults experience. By asking about
missed activities and memory failures each day for a week, older adults can remember more
relevant events and provide a more accurate picture of their actual cognitive failures as well
as the impact these failures are perceived to have on daily functioning. Unfortunately there
were very few missed activities due to attention and concentration reported in the checklist
about incomplete activities. However, as noted in the introduction, problems focusing
attention may occur frequently throughout day but in fleeting moments without actually
keeping individuals from performing daily activities. These moments still reflect failures of
the individual to control their attention and may provide an index their ability to focus their
thoughts. The assessment tools in the current study included a measure of daily cognitive
interference which assesses the extent to which an individual can focus their thoughts on the
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task at hand and control their experience of intrusive unproductive thoughts. Aim 2 examines
the psychometric properties of the cognitive interference scale designed to capture failures of
attention and concentration.
Aim 2
The cognitive interference rating scale was expected to assess a single, reliable
construct and capture daily variability in attention failures within an individual as well as
differences in attentional failures between individuals. Psychometric analyses were
conducted to establish two major points. First, I calculated the reliability of within-person
and between-person variability captured by the measure. Second, I determined whether a
one-factor solution best fits the data both between individuals as well as within individuals
across days. Finally, I investigated the discriminant validity of the scale by examining its
relationship to the construct of negative affect (Stawski et al., in review). Establishing that
the scale has adequate psychometric characteristics is a critical first step for any scale
intended to differentiate between individuals but also within an individual across days.
Verifying that the variability captured by the measure is reliable at the within-person level
allows researchers to be confident that the variability in responses is not due to the items used
or random error.
Before beginning the psychometric analyses, I fit a series of multilevel linear mixed
models to the data to extract the between and within person variability. I then calculated the
intraclass correlation (ICC), an index of the percentage of between person variability relative
to the total variability, for each of the items as well as the total score. The ICCs for the items
as well as the total score appear in Table 11. Approximately 61-68% of the variability in the
items was due to between person differences in cognitive interference, while 77% of
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variability in the total score was due to between person differences. Additionally, I examined
models using day in study to predict scores on the items as well as total score to determine
whether participant responding changed as the study period progressed. It is possible that
asking participants about their cognitive interference caused reactivity; participants may
begin to pay more attention to their thoughts and be more mindful of intrusions. There was a
significant main effect of day in study on item 8 (F[6, 621] = 2.22, p = .04). Average
responses on this item for the first day in the study were 2.54 (out of 7) compared with 2.17
on the last day in the study. There was also a marginally significant day in study effect on
item 3 (F[6, 621] = 1.97, p = .07). Again average responses on this item decreased slightly
over the course of the study, first day M = 2.56 v. last day M = 2.49. There were no other
significant main effects (p’s > .21). The effect of day in study was further investigated with
Generalizability theory models which will be described next.
After determining that variability existed at both the between and within person
levels among the items as well as in total scores, I addressed the hypotheses related to Aim 2.
Hypotheses related to aim 2
Hypothesis 4.
For the first hypothesis of aim 2, I used generalizabilty theory models (SAS proc
varcomp) to calculate the amount of variability in the items due to inter- and intraindividual
differences in cognitive interference. Generalizability theory (G-theory) uses techniques
similar to analysis of variance (ANOVA) to partition the variance in scores into a variety of
different sources, referred to in G-theory as facets. Using G-theory models I was able to
decompose the variability in the daily measure of cognitive interference into variance related
to items, persons, days, and the interactions of each. Any variability not accounted for by
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these sources was considered error. For these models, I followed the procedures outlined by
Cranford and colleagues (2006). The G-theory models in the current study were estimated
using the MIVQUE0 method in order to allow the use of data from participants who did not
complete all 7 evening assessments in the current study. Item was treated as a fixed factor as
the items in the current study represent the complete set of available items for the daily
assessment of cognitive interference at this time. For the first reliability estimate, day was
constrained to be fixed and person as well as all higher order interactions with person were
treated as random factors. The reliability estimates generated from this variance
decomposition then refers to any person measured on a given day. For the second estimate of
between-person reliability, the G-theory model was re-estimated treating day as a random
factor as well as person. This means that the reliability estimates produced from these
variance estimates will refer to a random individual assessed on a random day.
The full results of the G-theory models appear in Table 12. As indicated by the ICCs,
much of the variance is due to differences between individuals (~53%) and the remaining
variability is mostly accounted for by differences within persons across days (~15%) and
within person differences in responding to the different items (~9%). Although the mixed
models fit earlier found significant effects for day in study, day in study accounted for
relatively little variance in the data as a main effect (.09%) or as an interaction with item
(.03%).
Computing between- and within-person reliability estimates. Cranford and colleagues
(2006) proposed three equations (see equations 1-3) for quantifying reliable variance at the
between and within person levels using the variance components estimated in the G-theory
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models. The calculation of these estimates and the values in the current study are described
below.
Between-person reliability was calculated as the percentage of variability due to
persons and the person by item interaction (indicating that different individuals may vary in
their responses the individual items) divided by those terms plus the estimated variability
related to error (see Equation 1). When between-person reliability was calculated this way,
the estimated reliability was .981. This indicates that scores on the measure reflect relatively
stable individual differences in cognitive interference.
Within-person reliability was then calculated as the person by day interaction divided
by this same term plus the estimated variance due to error (see Equation 2). This coefficient
allowed the evaluation of the amount of reliable variance due to change within-persons
across days in the study. That is, it quantifies whether there is reliable interindividual
variability in intraindividual change across days. Using the variance decomposition estimates
from the model assuming day as a fixed factor the within-person reliability was estimated to
.849 implying that this measure was able to reliably assess systematic change in cognitive
interference within an individual.
One limitation to these analyses is that day was treated as a fixed effect rather than
random. This implies that the reliability coefficient derived would only apply if all
individuals were measured on the same fixed day. I estimated G-theory models treating both
day and person (as well as all higher order interactions involving these factors) as random to
estimate reliability coefficients that would account for the fact that subsequent research will
use new individuals (person random effect) and assess them on different days (day random
effect). Equation 3 is an extension of equation 1 treating day as a random rather than fixed
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effect. This equation includes day and the day by person interaction in the denominator to
account for these additional sources of variability when day is treated as a random effect. The
inclusion of these additional effects reduced the between-person reliability to .746 in the
current study. The reduction in the reliability estimate indicates that the ability of the
measure to differentiate between individuals when individuals are measured on different days
is lower though still in the acceptable range. However, estimating within-person reliability
within the random effects model left the estimate relatively unchanged at .85 indicating the
measure reliably discriminates within an individual across days regardless of the day of
measurement.
These reliability estimates indicate that reliable variance exists in the cognitive
interference measure at both the within and between person levels. The scale appears to be
capturing both differences between persons as well as differences within a person across
days. The next step was then to examine the factor structure of the scale, particularly
focusing on the unidimensionality of the scale.
Hypothesis 5.
I conducted a multi-level exploratory factor analysis (using Mplus) to determine
whether a one factor solution best fit the data at both the between- and within-person levels.
The number of factors was evaluated in three ways. First, I examined the scree plot graphing
the eigenvalues for the extracted factors to determine whether a one factor solution appears to
describe the data. The graph of these values appears in Figure 1. For the between-person
analysis, there was a clear one factor solution. This is supported by the scree plot as well as
applying Kaiser’s rule to the eigenvalues and the factor loadings (Table 13). For the withinperson solution however, there is a possible two factor solution. Two of the eigenvalues are
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above 1, the first factor accounting for 44.5% of the variance and the second accounting for
13% of the variance. Examining the model fits, a multilevel model constraining the between
structure to one factor and the within structure to two factors fit the data significantly better
than a model with one factor at each level, χ2diff(8) = 254.58, p < .0001. The TLI and RMSEA
also indicated that this model fit the data well. The TLI was .913, which exceeds the .9
criterion for this index suggested by Bentler (1990). The RMSEA for the between-level
model was .04 and.03 for the within-level model, both below the .05 criterion that indicates
excellent model fit (Browne & Cudeck, 1992). Inspection of the factor loadings indicated
that items 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 loaded on the first factor, items 7, 8, and 9 loaded significantly on
the second factor. Item 5 had equivalent loadings on both factors. Item content suggested that
the first factor reflected the experience of intrusive thoughts (e.g., think about personal
worries) while the second factor includes items assessing attempts to control and avoid
intrusive thoughts (e.g., try to put problems out of your mind). Although item 5 loaded on
both factors, the content of this item (i.e., try to avoid certain thoughts) implied that it
belonged on the second factor. The correlation between these factors was .686, p < .0001.
The finding of two factors at the within level was unexpected but the solution offers
insight into the underlying processes captured by the scale. The scale appears more than
adequate for tracking changes in cognitive interference within an individual across days. The
two factor solution indicated that the scale was able to differentiate the two major facets of
cognitive interference (experience and avoidance) at the within-person level. At the betweenperson level, the one factor solution differentiates among levels of ability of these processes
combined. The final step for examining the psychometrics of this measure was to establish
the discriminant validity of the cognitive interference scale. It was particularly important to
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determine whether the cognitive interference scale was capturing attempts and failures of
thought control or a more general construct related to that person’s mood that day. On days
when an individual reports experiencing higher negative affect, they may also report
difficulties with concentration and thinking about personal worries. The cognitive
interference scale was intended to capture attentional failures in general, not simply those
related to negative affect.
Hypothesis 6.
The construct of cognitive interference assessed in the current study is closely related
to that of rumination, a construct that has been used to characterize depression (NolenHoeksema, 2000). What differentiates cognitive interference from rumination is a lack of
emphasis on negative affect and a more general focus on distracting or unwanted thoughts
and attempts to control these thoughts. In order to establish that the cognitive interference
scale assessed this broader construct, I examined the relationship between this scale and the
negative affect scale administered as part of the evening assessment.
Using a multilevel confirmatory factor analysis, I fit two models to the negative affect
and cognitive interference data (Table 14). The first of these models assumed that all of the
items would load on a single factor. The second model assumed two different factors at the
between person level (one for negative affect and one for cognitive interference) and three
factors at the within person level: two factors for cognitive interference as suggested by the
multilevel exploratory factor analysis in hypothesis 5 and one factor for the negative affect
items at the within person level. Because these models are nested, model fit was assessed
using the amount of change in the chi-square statistic between the two models. Comparing
these models indicated that the model constraining the negative affect and cognitive

Everyday cognitive failures 80
interference to load on separate factors fit the data significantly better, χ2diff(4) = 878.33, p <
.0001. This implies that negative affect and cognitive interference form distinctly different
factors in this model.
I performed similar tests using the negative affect reports from each of the beeped
assessments throughout the day as well as the average of the negative affect items for the
beeped assessments. This resulted in fitting 10 additional models: 2 for each of the 5 beeped
assessments, one constraining all the items to load on a single factor and a second allowing
negative affect and cognitive interference to load on separate factors. The chi-square fits for
these models appear in Table 14. In no case did the one factor model fit the data better than
the two factor model. These findings were confirmed by the other model fit statistics. For the
one factor models the TLI ranged from .351 to .652, well below the .9 criterion for adequate
model fit. Similarly the RMSEA indices were all above .1 indicating poor model fit. The
models allowing negative affect and cognitive interference to load on separate factors had
TLI fits from .91 to .932 all indicating good model fit. The RMSEAs for these models also
indicated an excellent fit to the data as all were below .05. Finally, I examined the
correlations between negative affect and cognitive interference factors. These correlations
were high at the between-person level (r's = .61 to .75) indicating that individuals who tended
to experience more cognitive interference also tended to report more negative affect. The
correlations at the within person level were smaller; correlations with the interference factor
ranged from .22 to .54 and correlations with the avoidance factor ranged from .12 to .39. The
highest correlations among the factors were found with the negative affect data collected at
the evening assessment, the only time when negative affect and cognitive interference were
assessed concurrently.
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These analyses provide support for the cognitive interference scale having adequate
psychometric properties at both the between- and within-person levels. The scale taps
reliable variability at both levels and a supportable factor analytic model fit the data well
showing that the scale was sensitive to the major facets of cognitive interference at the
within-person level while differentiating individuals on the construct at the between-person
level. The final analyses established the discriminant validity of cognitive interference from
negative affect indicating that the cognitive interference scale is capturing variability related
to an individual's cognitive state outside of their actual mood. Although individuals who
report more negative affect were more likely to report more cognitive interference, the
relationship at the between-person level never approached a correlation higher than .75 and
the relationships at the within-person level were small to moderate at best. These results
indicate that the cognitive interference scale and scores derived from the items are
psychometrically valid in that they appear to reliably reflect the construct that I intended to
assess at the outset of the study. In aim 3 further analyses will be conducted to examine the
construct validity of this scale as well as the missed activities and memory failures checklists
to determine how the events reported in this study relate to in-lab cognitive performance.
Aim 3
The final aim of the current study focused on the construct validity of the daily
cognitive failures questionnaire. In the current study, participants completed a battery of labbased cognitive tasks that tapped working memory, episodic memory, and fluid intelligence.
One of the hurdles of assessing self-reported cognitive failures is establishing a relationship
between self-reports and actual cognitive performance. Previous research on daily self-
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reported cognitive failures has not looked at whether performance on in-lab cognitive tasks is
related to daily self-reports.
Before examining whether self-reported cognitive failures were related to cognitive
performance, I determined whether it was appropriate to create composite scores for each of
the cognitive constructs measured in the current study. I first examined the correlations
among the cognitive performance tasks and found that tasks within each of the constructs
(working memory, episodic memory, and fluid intelligence) were significantly correlated and
in general these correlations were higher within a construct compared with correlations
across constructs (Table 15). I then fit an exploratory factor analytic model to the data to
determine whether the tasks formed three separable factors. Given previous relationships of
these constructs the factor solution allowed the factors to be correlated using a Promax
rotation. This model extracted three factors with a eigenvalues greater than 1. Upon
inspection of the factor loadings, the tasks loaded as expected with the working memory
tasks loading on one factor, the episodic memory tasks loading on the second factor, and the
fluid intelligence tasks loading on the final factor. Some tasks did crossload on other factors
but this was expected given the correlated nature of these constructs (Table 16); all tasks had
their highest loading on their hypothesized factor.
After establishing that these tasks did appear to tap three separable constructs, I then
created composite scores for each individual by standardizing scores on each task and then
taking the sum of these standardized scores as an index of each of the different abilities.
These composite scores were then used to determine whether self-reported cognitive failures
were related to in-lab cognitive performance. First, I examined the Spearman correlations
among the composite scores and the frequency of failures for each of the different categories
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(Table 17). For this analysis, the frequencies were adjusted for response rate by dividing the
total number of failures reported in a given category by the number of evening surveys
correctly completed. These correlations suggested that the episodic memory composite score
was significantly related to reports of retrospective memory failures and missed activities due
to overload and the working memory composite was significantly related to the reporting of
missed activities due to somatic complaints. These relationships were small at best
suggesting only a weak relationship between cognitive performance and self-reported
cognitive failures.
Hypotheses related to Aim 3
Hypothesis 7.
The next step was to fit nonlinear mixed models using cognitive performance to
predict missed activities and memory failures. As with the models comparing frequency of
missed activities and memory failures across categories, these models also included
neuroticism to control for differences in reporting and cognitive performance due to
personality. I fit models to test whether each of the three composite scores was related to
self-reports of missed activities and memory failures. Where there were significant effects I
examined these effects by calculating the predicted outcomes for individuals of low and high
ability defined as one standard deviation below and above the average. Unless otherwise
specified risk ratios for these models were computed using high ability individuals as the
reference group. Risk ratios over 1 indicate greater risk for low ability individuals while
ratios below 1 indicate greater risk for high ability individuals.
Predicting cognitive failures with cognitive performance. In the first model using
working memory to predict frequency of reports in the four categories of missed activities
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and memory failures (overload, somatic, retrospective memory and prospective memory),
there was a significant category by working memory composite interaction (F[3, 381] = 4.24,
p < .01). This indicated that the relationship between working memory and failures depended
upon the category of failure being reported. Further examination of this finding indicated that
higher working memory scores were related to reporting fewer somatic failures (p = .01)
however, there were no other significant relationships (p's > .10). A risk ratio comparing
frequency of missed of activities due to somatic complaints for high and low WM ability
individuals was 1.43. Next, predicting frequency of failures with the composite score for
episodic memory there was a significant main effect of episodic memory performance (F[1,
381] = 16.82, p < .0001). Higher episodic memory performance was related to reporting
fewer retrospective memory failures and fewer missed activities due to somatic complaints
(p's < .01; RRs = 1.51 and 1.64). Episodic memory performance was also marginally related
to missed activities due to overload (p = .06); again higher performance predicted fewer
reported overload failures (RR = 1.24). Finally, the fluid intelligence composite score was
not significantly related to reported failures either as a main effect or as part of an interaction
(all p's > .14).
Age as a moderator between self-reported cognition and cognitive performance. Age
did not moderate any of the relationships between self-reported missed activities, memory
failures, and cognitive performance with one exception. Including age in the model with
episodic memory as a predictor of failures led to a significant three way interaction of age,
episodic memory, and category (F[3, 375] = 3.94, p < .01). The interaction indicated that
episodic memory ability was more predictive of the frequency of failures in younger adults
compared with older adults.
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Predicting atypical and typical failures with cognitive performance. Another potential
moderator could be characteristics of the failures themselves. To test this, I also examined
whether the relationship between cognitive performance and the categories of failures broken
down by routine and non-routine failures. Again typicality did not moderate the relationship
except in the case of missed activities due to somatic complaints. For working memory there
was a significant interaction with typicality; working memory significantly predicted missed
activities due to somatic complaints only for activities classified as not routine (RR = 1.67).
These results imply that, consistent with previous research, the relationships between
cognitive performance and self-reported cognitive failures are small regardless of
characteristics of the person and of the failures. Although cognitive performance was a
significant predictor of some self-reported missed activities and memory failures, most of the
categories were not predicted by cognitive performance. None of the cognitive composite
scores significantly predicted missed activities due to overload regardless of whether the
missed activity was routine or not routine. The most common finding was that cognitive
ability was related to missed activities due to somatic reasons: better ability was related to
fewer reported missed activities. This may imply a greater relationship between cognitive
performance and health rather than an important relationship between cognitive failures and
cognitive performance as somatic complaints are a non-cognitive reasons for missing an
activity. Possible reasons for these poor relationships will be discussed in detail in the
discussion section.
Hypothesis 8.
A further set of analyses was conducted to examine whether the temporal proximity
of the assessments of failures affected their relationship with objective cognitive
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performance. Failures reported closer in time to the second in-lab session (when the cognitive
tasks were administered) might show differential relationships compared with those reported
farther away in time. To test this hypothesis I included the cross-level interaction between
day in study (time) and the composite score representing cognitive ability. However, there
was no significant interaction between day in study and cognitive performance for any of the
categories of failures (p's > .11). This implies that the relationship between cognitive
performance and self-reports of cognitive failures did not depend on whether the failures
were reported closer to or farther from when the reports occurred.
Hypothesis 9.
After attempting to relate the counts of self-reported missed activities and memory
failures to cognitive performance, I also examined the relationship between the Likert-style
scale assessing failures of thought control and cognitive performance. As with the analyses
for hypothesis 7, I used composite scores representing each of the three cognitive ability
variables to predict scores on the cognitive interference scale. I created a sum score for the
entire scale but because the analyses in Aim 2, hypothesis 5 suggested that a two factor
structure best fit the data at the within person level, I also created two subscale scores to
determine whether the relationship between cognitive performance and cognitive interference
was more related to the experience of intrusive thoughts (intrusions subscale) or the
individual's attempts to avoid and suppress these thoughts (avoidance subscale). Before
fitting mixed models to these data, I examined the correlations between the cognitive
interference scores and the cognitive performance composites (Table 18). These correlations
were generally weak and only episodic memory was significantly correlated with total scores
and scores on the intrusions subscale.
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Predicting cognitive interference with cognitive performance. To examine these
relationships I fit multilevel linear mixed models using cognitive performance to predict the
cognitive interference score. Working memory was not significantly related to any of the
cognitive interference scores (p's > .12). Similarly, fluid intelligence was not related to
overall scores nor the subscale scores (p's > .09). Episodic memory did significantly predict
total scores on the cognitive interference scale, specifically individuals with better episodic
memory ability had higher cognitive interference scores, F(1, 129) = 4.22, p = .04. However,
when examining the effect of episodic memory and the subscale scores, episodic memory
was significantly related to reported intrusions (F[1, 129] = 4.83, p = .03) but only
marginally related to avoidance (F[1, 129] = 3.14, p = .07). Estimated means for each level
of ability appear in Table 19.
Predicting cognitive interference with cognitive performance across age. I then added
age to each of these models to determine whether age affected the relationship between
cognitive interference and cognitive performance. For all of these models, age was
significantly related to cognitive interference total scores and subscale scores such that older
adults reported less cognitive interference, both on the intrusions subscale and the avoidance
subscale (all p's < .01; Table 20). Age interacted with episodic memory performance to
predict both total scores (F[1, 124] = 3.98, p = .05) and scores on the intrusion subscale (F[1,
124] = 4.47, p = .04). For younger adults, higher episodic memory ability was related to
higher cognitive interference total scores and higher scores on the intrusions subscale
however this effect was reversed for older adults; higher episodic memory ability was related
to lower scores on both (Table 21). No other age by cognitive performance interactions were
significant (p's > .13).
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Hypothesis 10.
The last set of proposed analyses also examined whether the temporal proximity of
the cognitive interference assessment to the cognitive testing affected the relationship
between cognitive performance and cognitive interference. As with the analyses in
hypothesis 8, it may be that assessments completed closer in time to the cognitive testing
session are more related to cognitive performance than those completed farther away in time.
To test this, I added day in study to each of the models and examined the cross-level
interaction between cognitive performance and day in study. Day in study did not interact
with working memory performance to predict any of the cognitive interference scores (p's >
.13). The interaction between episodic memory performance and day in study was significant
for cognitive interference total scores, F(6, 614) = 2.84, p = .01 and avoidance subscale
scores, F(6, 614) = 3.72, p < .01. This effect implied that assessments completed in the
middle of the study period (i.e., days 2-5) were more related to episodic memory
performance compared to days at the end of the study. The interaction was not significant for
the intrusions subscale (p = .20). With regard to the models using fluid intelligence to predict
cognitive interference, the interaction between day in study and fluid intelligence was
significant in predicting scores on the avoidance subscale (F[1, 615] = 3.00, p < .01) though
not the total scores or the intrusions subscale (p's > .10). Assessments completed in the
beginning and middle of the week were more related to fluid intelligence performance
compared with assessments completed at the end of the study period.
I also examined models including cognitive performance, day in study as well as age
to predict cognitive interference. In none of these models was the day in study interaction
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with age or the three-way interaction with age, performance, and day in study significant (p's
> .22).
These models again suggested small relationships between cognitive performance and
daily self-reported cognitive failures. Although episodic memory was significantly related to
cognitive interference, working memory was not as previous research would suggest
(Stawski et al., 2006). This may have been related to the measures that make up the working
memory construct in the current study and will be discussed in detail in the discussion
section.
Supplemental analyses examining the construct validity of cognitive interference
Given that the relationships between cognitive performance and cognitive
interference were small, to provide additional evidence of construct validity for the cognitive
interference scale I also used the trait measures of cognitive interference administered in the
study to predict daily reports of cognitive interference. Showing that daily reports of intrusive
thinking are related to global trait assessments would provide evidence that the daily reports
taken outside the lab are tapping a similar construct as that assessed using validated measures
in the lab. In the current study, participants completed the Thought Occurrence questionnaire,
the Impact of Events scale, the White Bear Suppression inventory, and the punishment and
worry subscales of the Thought Control questionnaire. All of these questionnaires
significantly predicted scores on the cognitive interference total scores and both subscale
scores (all p's < .02). In all cases, higher scores on the trait measure were related to higher
daily self-reports of cognitive interference in general, as well as both subscales (Table 22).
These relationships also did not depend on age (all p's > .2).
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These trait questionnaires were completed prior to the seven days of daily
assessments. As with the cognitive performance analyses, it is possible that assessments
completed closer in time to the completion of the trait measures might be more strongly
related than those completed farther away in time. I included day in study in all of the models
to determine whether the cross-level interaction was significant. Only one of these
interactions was significant. Using the Thought Occurrence questionnaire and day in study to
predict scores on the intrusions factor indicated that assessments completed in the middle of
the week were more related to trait scores compared to those completed at the beginning and
end of the week (F[6, 604] = 2.12, p = .05). All other interactions did not reach significance
(p's > .09). I also added age to these models but there were no significant age by day in study
or age, day in study, and trait measure interactions (p's > .27). These analyses provide
additional evidence of the construct validity for the daily reports of cognitive interference.
Discussion
Summary of results
An age-diverse sample of participants completed seven days of daily assessments as
well as a battery of cognitive tests and personality measures. During the daily assessments,
participants reported on activities they did not complete, any memory failures they
experienced, and their perception of their ability to control their thoughts that day. The main
goal of the current study was to examine and validate these assessment tools for the
measurement of cognitive failures to determine whether they are appropriate for use in daily
diary studies.
For Aim 1 overload failures were most frequently reported but had less perceived
impact on daily functioning compared with missed activities due to non-cognitive reasons,
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that is somatic complaints. Importantly, frequency and impact of reported failures did depend
on typicality of the failures. Older adults reported significantly more missed activities and
memory failures across categories but found these events less irritating, less interfering and
less likely to be related to future consequences than younger adults.
Aim 2 found that the cognitive interference questionnaire assessed reliable variance at
both the between and within person levels. The factor structure suggested a unidimensional
scale between-persons and a two factor scale within-persons indicating good discrimination
of the processes involved in cognitive interference at the within-level. This scale tapped a
construct distinct from negative affect providing evidence of discriminant validity for the
scale.
The final aim demonstrated that, consistent with previous research on self-reported
cognitive failures, there were weak relationships among objective cognitive performance
measures and daily self-reported cognitive failures. Higher episodic memory performance
scores were significantly related to lower reports of certain types of missed activities and
memory failures however the other measures of cognitive performance were not. These
relationships did not depend on age or the characteristics of the reported events themselves.
Lower episodic memory ability was also related to greater reports of unproductive repetitive
thoughts but only in older adults.
Discussion of the results will begin with the findings from aim 1; specifically the
frequency and impact of daily cognitive failures and implications for current research in the
area.
Frequency and impact of cognitive failures
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Results from the current study provide more detailed information regarding the
relative frequency perceived impact of daily missed activities and memory failures compared
with previous research. Research has yet to incorporate measures of perceived impact of
daily cognitive failures on an individual's functioning. Assessing impact as well as frequency
allowed the current study to begin to investigate which daily missed activities and memory
failures were most frequently reported but also which had the greatest perceived impact on an
individual's ability to meet daily cognitive demands. Previous research had suggested that
prospective memory failures would be the most frequently reported memory failure outside
the lab (Terry, 1988). This is coupled with the belief that these failures will be associated
with significant personal consequences (McDaniel & Einstein, 2007; Reason, 1984), though
this had not been tested empirically. Data in the current study suggests that prospective
memory failures are in fact not reported more frequently than retrospective memory failures.
Instead the only difference between prospective memory and retrospective memory failures
was the ratings of anticipated future consequences.
Differences in the perceived consequences of prospective and retrospective memory
failures suggests two reasons why previous research has found that prospective memory
failures were more frequent. First, because of the research and theorizing on the importance
of prospective memory in daily life (see McDaniel & Einstein, 2007), previous efforts aimed
at studying everyday cognitive failures have focused primarily on prospective memory
failures. For example, the 10-item measure developed by Whitbourne and colleagues (2008)
includes 5 items assessing prospective memory failures. This oversampling of prospective
memory failures compared with retrospective memory failures would lead to the misleading
conclusion that prospective memory failures are more common simply because participants
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have more opportunities to report on those failures. Second, in order for a participant to
report on a daily cognitive failure they must first notice that they have even experienced a
failure. Following noticing the failure they must also be able to recall the failure when
actually filling out the questionnaire (Rabbitt & Abson, 1990). Failures associated with
greater future consequences would be more likely to be remembered when the participant is
filling out a questionnaire. Therefore, because prospective memory failures have a greater
impact on daily life, they are more likely to be reported on self-report measures of cognitive
failures when participants retrospect over long periods of time. The shorter time frame in the
current study allowed participants to depend less on biased memory processes to recall
failures.
This stresses the importance of the reporting interval for cognitive failures. To be
recalled, the memories of cognitive failures must be retained until the participant completes
the questionnaire. The research suggesting that prospective memory failures are most
frequent in everyday life used long reporting intervals which likely forced participants to
attempt to recall their failures over weeks and months. Researchers hypothesize that global
self-reports like these are based more on a participant's beliefs about their memory; beliefs
that are formed by those failures that can be remembered rather than all instances of failures
(Cavanaugh et al., 1998). Because prospective memory failures have a greater impact on the
individual's daily functioning, they are more likely to be remembered and reported on global
reports of cognitive failures. On the other hand, retrospective memory failures may be
underreported due to their relatively lower impact. The current study used a shorter reporting
interval (i.e., during the day today) which might have allowed participants to better recall
their retrospective memory failures while completing the assessment. This might also explain
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why the current study found no difference in the frequencies of prospective and retrospective
memory failures. The shorter reporting interval supported recall of failures of both types of
memory failures rather than capturing just those failures that are most memorable (i.e.,
prospective memory failures). This shortened interval reduced the recall bias associated with
prospective memory failures and likely provided a more accurate description of the relative
frequency of memory failures in daily life.
The current study also permitted a closer look at specific types of retrospective
memory failures, that is, whether the failure occurred for recently learned or well-known
information. Previous research on self-reported cognitive failures has tended not to
distinguish between the nature of the information forgotten in this way but lab-based research
would suggest that well-known information would be less likely to be forgotten compared
with recently learned information (Craik, 1994). In the current study, however, participants
reported more failures for well-known information. This was in contrast to the impact ratings
which indicated that forgetting well-known information was more interfering with daily
activities. One possible reason for the difference in frequency is that well-known information
is accessed more often than recently learned information so there are more opportunities for
failures. The impact ratings indicate that forgetting a piece of recently learned information,
though less common, causes greater problems in daily life. Importantly this suggests that
memory training programs and aids (e.g., Rebok, Carlson, & Langbaum, 2007) should target
recently learned information rather than well-known information. In this way ratings of
impact can assist in directing interventions toward remediating those failures that create the
most difficulty in everyday life. This focused approach to designing interventions to improve
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everyday cognitive functioning could increase the effectiveness of training programs outside
the lab (c.f. Jobe et al., 2001).
A potential limitation of these findings is that the end of day reporting strategy used
in the current study is still subject to some degree of forgetting and reappraisal. The current
study did not probe when failures actually occurred throughout the day and it is likely that
failures that occurred farther away in time from the end of the day assessment were less
likely to be recalled compared with those closer in time. One remedy for this is to have
participants report failures as they occur throughout the day (cf. Yamanaka, 2003).
Unfortunately, reappraisal of the failure can play a role even over these shortened reporting
intervals. Participants may reframe failures at the time of reporting to preserve their beliefs
about their cognitive abilities (Cavanaugh et al., 1998).
This emphasizes a possible benefit of the approach in the current study. Previous
research on daily cognitive failures used items framed such that the participant had to admit
having problems with cognitive activities (Neupert et al., 2006a; 2006b; Whitbourne et al.,
2008). Admitting problems with cognitive functioning has negative implications and
connontations for all individuals and older adults may be particularly sensitive to this as
inability to complete cognitive activities of daily living can impact their ability to live
independently (Reese & Cherry, 2004; 2006). In the current study, a participant could report
missing activities because they were instead too tired, too ill or had to deal with a more
important activity rather than simply admitting they had difficulty. They were also given an
opportunity to indicate the extent to which the missed activity or memory failure impacted
their day which may have encouraged reporting from participants; they could report
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forgetting something but also indicate that the memory failure would not have future
consequences.
Effects of age on frequency and impact of cognitive failures
Previous research had found that older adults do not report more daily cognitive
failures than younger adults (Neupert et al., 2006a; 2006b; Whitbourne et al., 2008).
However, consistent with lab-based research on cognitive performance (Burgess et al., 2006;
Cohn, Emrich, & Moscovitch, 2008; Old & Naveh-Benjamin, 2008) older adults reported
poorer daily cognitive functioning than younger adults in the current study. Importantly,
older adults were less bothered by their failures, considered them less interfering, and less
likely to be related to future consequences. Taken together these findings begin to provide
some explanation for the inconsistent findings in the current study and previous research
(Whitbourne et al., 2008). There are three general reasons the findings in the current study
differ from previous research. First, the shorter reporting interval may aid in the recall of
failures at the time of reporting. Second, previous research has provided a limited number of
examples of failures and framed these failures in ways that may threaten older adults. Third,
older adults place less importance on their failures making them less likely to be recalled.
Each of these points will be discussed in detail below.
Finding that older adults report more failures than younger adults is in contrast to
other self-report studies using global self-reports of failures and finding no age differences
(Hertzog et al., 2000; Reese & Cherry, 2007). One potential reason for the difference in
findings is the shortened reporting interval in the current study. Rabbitt and Abson (1990)
noted that "individuals with poorer memories are more likely to 'forget that they forget'" (p.
3), an effect that may be more important as individuals age. Lab evidence shows that even in
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normal aging, older adults are experiencing some degree of memory loss (Cohn, Emrich, &
Moscovitch, 2008; Old & Naveh-Benjamin, 2008). This memory loss then makes it more
difficult for them to remember what they have forgotten leading to an underreporting of
cognitive failures. This effect is compounded as poorer memory leads to both more failures
as well as more failures being forgotten. As adults age then, their accuracy of self-reporting
memory failures becomes impaired, particularly when reporting over long intervals of time.
Shortening the reporting interval can assist with this problem by reducing the interval
between the occurrence of the failure and reporting but does not completely eliminate it as
evidenced by the findings of Whitbourne and colleagues (2008; see also Neupert et al.,
2006).
The current study extended the range of failures assessed and allowed participants to
report on any missed activity regardless of why it was incomplete. Whitbourne and
colleagues (2008) focused their cognitive failures assessment on memory failures in general
and prospective memory failures in particular. While this focus is appropriate given previous
research suggesting that prospective memory failures are common in everyday life (Crawford
et al., 2003; Harris, 1984; Terry, 1988) and a primary concern among older adults (Kleigl &
Martin, 2003), it also limits the scope of failures that can be reported by the individual. The
current study allowed participants to report on a wider range of failures and included an
"other" option for activities and memory failures that did not seem to fit in the other
categories. Additionally, as noted earlier, framing events as missed activities rather than as
mental mistakes may have encouraged participants, particularly older adults, to report events
separate from the negative appraisals of those events. Similarly, older participants could also
indicate that although a failure had occurred it had not negatively impacted their daily
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activities, effectively indicating that their cognitive failures were not necessarily impairing
their functioning.
The age effects on the impact ratings provide a third reason for previous findings of
no age differences in self-reported cognitive failures. Older adults may actually experience
more failures outside the lab than they report because these failures are not associated with
meaningful consequences in their daily life. Failures that do not have an impact on daily life
may be less likely to be noticed and remembered. Additionally older adults may place less
importance on the impact that failures have on their daily life. Socioemotional selectivity
theory proposes that older adults place more importance on social relationships and positive
emotional experiences while reducing the importance placed on the cognitive aspects of their
life (Carstensen, 1995). The impact data from the current study support this idea with the
finding that older adults reported less irritation, less interference, and fewer consequences
from their failures despite the fact that they report significantly more failures. If older adults
place less importance on their cognitive failures they may be less motivated to remember
their failures and, by virtue of this, less able to report on these failures. Additionally, the
current study allowed older adults to report events as well as the impact of these events.
Older adults may have felt more comfortable reporting a cognitive failure when they could
also indicate that this failure had little to no impact on their daily functioning. The lack of age
effects in previous studies might be partially due to older adults remembering fewer failures
in general as they complete assessments of cognitive failures regardless of when the
assessment occurs.
Limitations of assessing failure subtypes
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Allowing participants to report on the "reason" they missed an activity is a novel
approach to the assessment of everyday cognitive failures. These "reasons" were broken into
four categories based on a priori hypotheses of how they would be related to cognitive
processes. Missed activities due to overload consisted of more "reasons" than any other
category. Missed activities due to overload reflected both external demands (e.g., something
more important came up) as well as poor planning on the part of the participant (e.g., out of
time) which lead to more opportunities for failures outside the lab. This is likely one reason
why missed activities due to overload were the most frequently reported. A post hoc
examination of the between-person relationships of failures reported for the different
"reasons" revealed that while some of these classifications were related to one another as
anticipated (i.e., frequencies were significantly correlated within category) other relationships
were apparent (Table 24). For example, reports of failures for "out of time", "interrupted" and
"something more important came up" were categorized as overload failures and were
correlated with one another (r's = .13 to .30) but "too difficult" and "avoided it" (also
included in the category of overload failures) were more strongly related to "couldn't
concentrate" (r's = .20 to .22). Similarly, while "interrupted" was related to other reasons in
the overload category, it was also significantly related to failures reported as "started, but
forgot to finish" (r = .33), a failure categorized as due to prospective memory. These findings
suggest that the overload failures category may have reflected a more diverse range of
cognitive failures than originally anticipated.
Similarly, for memory failures not all a priori categorizations of failures were
reflected in the correlations. For example, failure to complete an errand was categorized as a
prospective memory failure however inspection of the correlations suggested that a failure
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for an errand was more strongly related to items classified as retrospective memory failures
(information: r = .25, date: r = .34, and directions: r = .24; Table 25) than other items
classified as prospective memory (r's = -.02 to .08). As indicated earlier, there is a
retrospective memory component to every prospective memory task and these failures likely
represent some combination of these failures. Similarly supplying participants with more
forgotten items would allow a better differentiation of categories of failures as well as more
reports of failures in general. While the a priori categories in the current study have
theoretical merit, future research should refine the categories of failures.
Another limitation was the inability of the current assessment to directly measure
failures due to poor attention and concentration. Only 11 attention failures were reported
using the current categorization scheme. It is likely that some attentional failures were
captured as part of some other cognitive failure. For example, not focusing attention while
someone is being introduced might make it difficult or impossible to recall their name at a
later point in time. That is, the failure of attention affects the encoding process but is reported
as a retrospective memory failure at a later date. Similarly, attentional processes are
hypothesized to be responsible for noticing environmental cues that indicate it is time for the
individual to complete a prospective memory task (McDaniel & Einstein, 2007; Smith &
Bayen, 2006). A failure of attention could impair the individual's ability to notice the
environmental cue leading to a prospective memory failure. Although the attentional failure
actually preceded and likely caused the prospective memory failure, the individual may
report on the outcome of the process, in this case, the prospective memory failure. This is
likely one reason why attention failures were underreported as part of the categories of
cognitive failures.
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In the current study, these items were supplemented by a Likert-style questionnaire
specifically tapping a participant’s perception of their ability to attend and focus their
thoughts that day. It may be that asking individuals to report on a single instance of an
attentional failure is difficult because the attentional failure, by its very nature, is unlikely to
be noticed. A thought sampling paradigm would circumvent this burden to some extent (e.g.,
Kane et al., 2007), however, thought sampling may also create reactivity as participants
monitor thoughts more than they typically would due to the frequency of reporting. The
Likert scale in the current study attempts to capture participants' perceptions of the frequency
of these failures during the previous day without significantly impacting participant's daily
experiences with cognitive interference.
Reliability and validity of the cognitive interference questionnaire
The cognitive interference questionnaire in the current study provided a quantitative
assessment of attention and concentration throughout the day. The quantitative nature of this
scale allowed a psychometric analysis of its properties to establish that it was appropriate for
a daily diary study. As is typical in the development of a scale, I first investigated the
reliability of the scale for assessing between person differences as well as within-person
variability in cognitive interference. Just as researchers would not use a scale for assessing
between-person differences without first assessing the reliability of the scale, development of
a scale for the assessment of within-person variability should include an examination of the
psychometric properties of the scale at this level. Instead, daily diary studies use measures
that have known psychometric properties for between-person comparisons and assume this
information is relevant for their use in within-person analyses. There are very few examples
of reliability analyses that address the utility of measures for capturing within-person
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processes in daily diary studies (e.g., Cranford et al., 2006). Analyses in the current study
suggested that the extended cognitive interference scale adequately assessed reliable
variability both between and within individuals. Establishing this property indicates that the
scale would be appropriate for assessing fluctuations in an individual's ability to focus their
attention over brief intervals (i.e., days) and allow the identification the day level factors
associated with these fluctuations (e.g., daily stress; e.g., Sliwinski, Smyth, Hofer & Stawski,
2006; Stawski et al., 2006).
Testing the ergodicity assumption in the cognitive interference questionnaire
The second set of psychometric analyses the factor structure at each level of analysis.
Daily diary research tends to implicitly make the ergodicity assumption; that the factor
structure of a set of indicators observed at the between-person level also describes the
structure that would be observed within persons (Borsboom, Mellenbergh, & van Heerden,
2003; Molenaar, 2008). However this assumption needs to be explicitly tested before
drawing conclusions regarding within-person processes (Hofer & Piccinin, 2010). In the
current study, I found that the ergodic assumption did not hold; the factor structure at the
within-person level was different from that at the between-person level. At the betweenperson level a one factor structure best fit the data, however at the within-person level a two
factor structure best fit the data. The within-person factor structure reflects the different
facets of cognitive interference identified in the introduction: experience of intrusive
thoughts and suppression of those thoughts. This is similar to the factor structure proposed
(though not always found) for standard trait measures of cognitive interference. For example,
the Impact of Events Scale and White Bear Suppression Inventory were specifically designed
and have been shown to assess two factors: intrusions and attempts at suppression (Creamer,
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Bell, & Failla, 2003; Hoping & de Jong, 2003). It would appear that at the momentary level
these two processes are more easily differentiated than when measured at the trait level. It is
possible that within-persons these processes function somewhat independently of one
another. That is, a person may experience intrusions without actively attempting to avoid or
suppress them. It is also possible to have an intrusive thought that is not actively suppressed.
On the other hand, it is also possible to have just a few intrusive thoughts and to attempt to
control each and every one. In the first instance, the experience and control would be less
tightly coupled than in the second case. The daily measure of cognitive interference is able to
pick up on these day-to-day differences in the coupling of these processes. However,
individuals who, on average, experience higher levels of intrusive thoughts have more
opportunities to attempt to avoidance and suppress these thoughts than individuals who
experience fewer intrusive thoughts. This would indicate that averaging over time makes it
difficult, if not impossible, to separate the processes.
Separation of cognitive interference and negative affect
Due to the strong relationship between cognitive interference and constructs like
rumination I also tested whether negative affect and cognitive interference were separable
constructs at both the between and within person levels. Previous work has shown that these
constructs are strongly correlated between individuals (r's > .45; Erksine, Kvavilashvili, &
Kornbot, 2007; Rude, Maestas, & Neff, 2007) as well as within (Moberly & Watkins, 2008).
Models in the current study examined whether the extended cognitive interference scale
tapped a construct that was separable from negative affect (which is closely related to
depressive rumination; Moberly & Watkins, 2008). There was evidence of discriminant
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validity of the cognitive interference scale and negative affect at both the between and within
person levels.
Providing evidence of the dissociation of cognitive interference processes (i.e.,
intrusions v. control) at the within-person were the correlations between the cognitive
interference factors and negative affect. Similar to the findings of Courvoisier et al. (2009), I
found that the intrusions factor was generally more strongly correlated with negative affect
than the suppression factor. These results imply that the extended cognitive interference
measure is able to distinguish these two processes at the within-person level. This is
particularly useful as these processes may be influenced by different day-level processes.
Being able to differentiate between two distinct processes will provide a better understanding
of within-person relationships of cognitive interference with other related constructs (e.g.,
rumination, perseverative thinking, stress, negative affect).
These analyses provide strong evidence for the use of this measure in daily diary
studies on intraindividual variability in attentional failures but also serve as a caution for
researchers interested in daily diary research. Measures developed to tap a construct at the
between-person level may not exhibit the same psychometric characteristics when attempting
to assess day-to-day variability.
Linking self-report and lab-based cognitive measures
There was only weak evidence of a relationship between self-reported cognitive
failures and cognitive performance in the lab. The lack of a strong relationship between daily
self-reported failures and cognitive performance in the lab was disappointing but not
unexpected. Previous research relating self-reports and lab-based cognitive tasks has often
found small correlations except where the lab-based tasks directly mirror the cognitive
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demand outside the lab (Liu & Park, 2004; Hertzog et al., 2000). Episodic memory ability
was significantly related to reports of somatic failures, retrospective memory failures, and
cognitive interference scores. This suggests that the episodic memory tasks tapped a more
general set of cognitive processes that are employed outside as well as inside the lab to
complete memory tasks. On the other hand, the working memory tasks, which had been
predicted to be related to cognitive interference but were not, may have focused too tightly
on specific processes that are not recruited as often outside the lab as they are in the lab.
Weak relationships between self-reported and lab-based cognition
Three potential reasons for the weak relationships between self-reports of cognitive
failures and cognitive performance are discussed next. First, the in-lab cognitive assessments
may have been too narrow compared with the processes tapped by the self-reported cognitive
failures. Second, cognitive failures in normal functioning individuals may be more related to
environmental demands than cognitive ability. Third, the sample in the current study was
highly selective, possibly restricting the range of ability assessed in the lab.
The first possible reason for the weak relationship found in the current study is that
the tasks selected for the in-lab assessment tapped cognitive processes that were not key to
the cognitive failures outside the lab. To meet cognitive demands outside the lab a variety of
different cognitive processes are likely recruited by the individual concurrently to complete
the cognitive task (Cohen & Conway, 2008). In the lab however tasks are designed to isolate
and tap only one of these processes at a time. For example, the working memory tasks in the
current study were designed to specifically assess updating and manipulation processes. It
may be that when cognitive processes are recruited outside the lab to meet a cognitive
demand, the specific processes assessed in the lab are only recruited to a small extent and
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others (e.g., resistance to distraction, planning) are recruited to a greater extent. This would
account for the small though significant relationships found between failures and specific
cognitive processes. These failures are due to some extent on the measured cognitive process
but also depend on other processes (e.g., task switching, mental updating).
A second potential reason for these weak relationships is that, within the normal
range of functioning, cognitive failures outside the lab may have more to do with
environmental factors than with actual ability. Typical everyday cognitive demands may not
tax individuals to the limit of their abilities. Because of this external factors (e.g., stress,
somatic complaints or being interrupted) that disrupt functioning have a greater impact on an
individual's ability to meet daily cognitive demands. Researchers have found that daily
processes such as the experience of a daily stressor are significantly related to poorer
performance on cognitive tasks both in the lab (Sliwinski, et al., 2006) as well as more
memory failures outside the lab (Neupert et al., 2006). It may be only when daily cognitive
demands push individuals to the limits of their ability or they experience significant
impairment in their ability (e.g., head trauma or MCI) that it plays a role in whether these
demands are met. This may be one reason why memory complaints are related to actual
cortical damage in older adults (Striepens et al., 2010; van der Flier et al., 2004). For
individuals within the normal levels of cognitive ability the number of cognitive failures
made is better predicted by external events (e.g., stressors, physical symptoms) rather than
their cognitive ability.
A third potential reason for the weak relationships in the current study, particularly
between working memory and cognitive interference, is the selectivity of the sample in the
current study. The current study included a pre-study component that required participants to
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complete all of surveys correctly (i.e., on time, remembering to complete morning or evening
survey) on their own. Individuals with lower cognitive ability either forgot to complete the
surveys and were excluded from the longer study or may have chosen to not to continue their
participation due to the high demands. This could have restricted the range of cognitive
ability sampled in the current study with an under-sampling of individuals at the low end of
the ability scale. Although the distributions for each of the cognitive tasks appeared
approximately normal the mean of the distributions may have been shifted to the right
implying poor representation of the left side of the distribution (i.e., low cognitive ability).
Construct validity of the cognitive interference scale
Though the relationship between cognitive interference and cognitive performance
was weak, there was some evidence of construct validity for the cognitive interference scale
as it was related to more traditional paper-based measures of trait cognitive interference. All
of the validated measures were related to scores on the daily cognitive interference scale with
higher trait levels of cognitive interference predicting higher daily reports of cognitive
interference. This indicates that reports completed outside the lab over a shortened time
period are tapping the same construct as the trait measures in the lab. Although the lack of
relationship with cognitive performance is problematic, the daily measure of cognitive
interference does appear to capture the same construct as the trait measures of cognitive
interference.
Limitations of the current study and suggestions for future research
There are several limitations in the current study. One major limitation in the current
study was the lack of a baseline for individuals' daily activities. Without knowing more about
a given participant's routine it is impossible to tell how many opportunities they had to
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experience a missed activity. A participant with no activities planned that day has no chance
to miss those activities whether for cognitive reasons or otherwise. Individuals with different
social roles will experience different environmental demands during their daily routine. For
example, someone employed as a caregiver will have a different schedule and must meet
different demands compared with a stockbroker. Future research should include measures of
daily activities and routines to determine an individual's level of busyness on any given day.
Optimally, this would be part of a morning assessment as busyness likely varies daily but
could also be included as a global measure of environmental demands (e.g., Martin & Park,
2003). Another potential method would be to specifically recruit individuals with similar
social roles (e.g., nurses, caregivers, or teachers).
Another recommendation for future research is to include more focused questions
about activities missed due to problems with attention and concentration. One possibility
would be to include a question about consequences related to intrusive thoughts that day
(e.g., To what extent did these thoughts prevent you from getting things done?). Additionally,
some cognitive tasks that one might deal with in daily life were not included in the measure.
Activities like mental math (e.g., tip calculation), reading, and writing were not specifically
mentioned in the questions and might be more susceptible to cognitive failures. Although
these activities were likely reported as part of another category (e.g., reading a book as a
recreational activity or an "other" activity) they may have gone underreported by not being
specifically included. Similarly with the memory failures question, prospective memory
failures that include arriving in a location without remembering why you were there might be
a common failure that was not reported because the option was not presented. These failures
might have been reported as "other" in that item but also may not have been reported at all.
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Adding some of these activities and memory failures would likely increase the number of
failures reported as well as improve the relationships between this measure and cognitive
performance in the lab. For example, mental math (e.g., tip calculation) often requires
maintenance and updating of information in working memory and might be more related to
the working memory tasks in the current study compared with some of the failures currently
assessed.
A third suggestion for future studies would be to include a cue to remind participants
to complete the evening questionnaire. Although compliance was high in the current study (>
80%), participants more likely to report prospective memory failures were also more likely to
forget to do the evening survey. Including a beep at the approximate time when the
participant is supposed to do a survey would likely help participants remember to do the
survey. Similarly, asking participants to complete the survey earlier in the evening might
improve recall of failures during the major portion of the day. Participants were asked to
complete the survey when they went to bed each night. A little over 20% of the surveys were
completed after midnight which might have been too far removed from some of the events
for the participant to recall them. Asking participants to complete the survey earlier in the
evening might improve recall for events that occurred earlier in the day.
Finally, the current study focused on just one attribute of the cognitive failures:
whether the missed activity was part of the participant's regular routine or not. It's possible
that other characteristics of failures are more important for relating them to cognitive
performance and impact on daily functioning. A failure for an activity or information that are
high in personal relevance or would have led to significant personal gain might be
differentially related to cognitive performance. Collecting information on these attributes of
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the failures would allow failures to be broken down based on these factors to provide a more
specific definition of the failures and this might change the relationship between failures and
cognitive performance.
Synopsis of key findings
,Assessing daily cognitive failures presents a unique challenge for researchers
interested in understanding how cognitive demands are met (or not) outside the lab. The
current study examined a novel approach to assessing these failures and provided data
suggesting this measure was able to provide insight on daily cognitive failures and their
impact on the individual. Three important findings emerged from the analysis of the daily
diary data in the current study.
First, allowing participants to distinguish between the occurrence of an event and the
impact that event has on their daily functioning may have encouraged more accurate
reporting of missed activities and memory failures than in previous research. Particularly
with older adults, providing participants the opportunity to indicate the extent to which their
functioning was compromised by particular memory failures and missed activities may have
increased their comfort with indicating that these events occur in their daily lives.
A second important finding is that the processes hypothesized to be involved in
cognitive interference (i.e., intrusions and avoidance) can be differentiated with intensive
daily assessments of intrusive thinking without introducing significant reactivity to this
assessment. These processes have been proposed but are difficult to separate at the betweenperson level. However analyses in the current study demonstrated that within-persons over
days two distinct, measurable processes exist. In-depth examination of these processes at this
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level may begin to provide researchers with more information about an individual's daily
cognitive experience.
Finally, daily self-reports of memory failures and missed activities remain unrelated
to objective cognitive performance. This begins to suggest that, for normal functioning
individuals, environmental demands may have a greater impact on cognitive functioning
outside the lab rather than an individual's cognitive ability. There is no relationship between
self-reported cognitive failures and objective performance because daily cognitive demands
only require a minimal amount of cognitive ability to complete while in-lab tasks push
individuals to the limits of their ability. Rather than focusing on the lack of relationship
between these two assessments of cognition, researchers should examine what environmental
demands and external factors cause failures outside the lab; cognitive ability may only play a
small role in what daily cognitive demands an individual is able to meet.
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Table 1
Breakdown of participant compliance on the evening survey

Number of Evening
Assessments
Completed
7
6
5
4
3
2
1

N
63
26
18
9
7
6
2

%
48.09
19.85
13.74
6.87
5.34
4.58
1.53

Cumulative %
48.09
67.94
81.68
88.55
93.89
98.47
100
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Table 2
Breakdown of participant compliance for the beeped surveys

Number of Beeped
Assessments
completed
100%
90%-99%
80%-89%
70%-79%
60%-69%
50%-59%
< 50%

N
10
46
33
13
11
6
12

%
7.63
35.11
25.19
9.92
8.4
4.58
9.16

Cumulative %
7.63
42.75
67.94
77.86
86.26
90.84
100
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Table 3
Correlations among personality, age, and cognitive performance with compliance
Beeped
Compliance
-0.15
0.11
-0.03
-0.05
-0.15

Evening
Compliance
-0.18
0.09
-0.12
-0.03
0.12

-0.26

-0.18

-0.11

-0.14

Thought Control
Questionnaire
Punishment Subscale

-0.08

-0.21

White Bear Suppression
Inventory

-0.18

-0.13

Episodic Memory
Composite Score

0.04

0.17

Working Memory
Composite Score

0.09

0.10

Fluid Intelligence
Composite Score
Age

0.19
0.18

0.13
0.20

Extraversion
Conscientiousness
Neuroticism
Openness
Agreeableness
Thought Occurrence
Questionnaire
Thought Control
Questionnaire
Worry Subscale

*Note: Values in bold indicate p<.05, values in italics indicate p<.07. Due to missing data
on the questionnaire measures n's vary from 128-131.
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Table 4
Correlations among cognitive failure frequencies, impact ratings and neuroticism

Overload
Neuroticism
.03

Neuroticism

Neuroticism

Overload
.27

Overload
.29

Overload
Neuroticism
.09

PM
.26

Frequencies*
RM
.17

Attention
.10

Somatic
.20

PM
.28

Bother Ratings
RM
.28

Attention
.33

Somatic
.00

PM
.28

Interference
Ratings
RM
.12

Attention
.34

Somatic
-.06

PM
.25

Consequence
Ratings
RM
.28

Attention
-.69

Somatic
-.13

Note. Due to missing data sample sizes differ for the impact rating correlations (n = 8 84). * Frequency correlations used frequency of failures adjusted for number of days the
evening survey was correctly completed to control for reporting biases. Frequency
correlations were calculated using Spearman correlations.
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Table 5
Frequency of failures reported by category and reason
Meet/Talk
with someone

Recreational Physical
Activity
Activity

School
Activity

Work
Activity

Self-Care
Activity

Household
Activity

Other

Total

% of all
Failures

Out of time

15

21

7

4

17

4

29

19

116

18.50

Interrupted

1

5

7

4

7

3

10

8

45

7.18

Forgot to start
Couldn't
Concentrate
Something
more important
Started but,
forgot to finish

2

3

3

0

1

2

3

3

17

2.71

0

1

0

2

2

0

6

0

11

1.75

3

14

12

0

3

5

24

10

71

11.32

1

0

0

0

0

1

8

3

13

2.07

Avoided it

7

2

7

1

6

5

30

8

66

10.53

Too difficult

5

1

4

2

4

2

6

3

27

4.31

Tired

5

9

5

2

7

6

23

2

59

9.41

Ill

14

9

25

0

2

7

29

13

99

15.79

Other

20

12

19

5

8

11

7

21

103

16.43

Total
% of all
Failures

73

77

89

20

57

46

175

90

11.64

12.28

14.19

3.19

9.09

7.34

27.91

14.35
Overall
Total
627
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Table 6
Frequency and impact ratings for each category of missed activities

Bother Ratings
Frequency

Interference Ratings

Consequence Ratings

Mean-A
(SD)
3.11
(1.61)

Mean-M
(SD)
2.97
(1.54)

Mean-A
(SD)
2.59
(1.50)

Mean-M
(SD)
2.47
(1.41)

Mean-A
(SD)
2.69
(1.65)

Mean-M
(SD)
2.55
(1.55)

Overload Failures

325

Out of time

116

2.77
(1.56)

2.71
(1.55)

2.27
(1.44)

2.24
(1.44)

2.37
(1.53)

2.33
(1.49)

Interrupted

45

2.93
(1.59)

2.88
(1.52)

2.75
(1.46)

2.66
(1.42)

2.38
(1.63)

2.31
(1.61)

Something more
important

71

2.62
(1.51)

2.61
(1.50)

2.42
(1.45)

2.41
(1.45)

2.38
(1.63)

2.37
(1.63)

Avoided it

66

3.30
(1.51)

3.26
(1.47)

2.39
(1.32)

2.34
(1.31)

2.93
(1.49)

2.89
(1.45)

Too difficult

27

4.08
(1.61)

4.06
(1.57)

3.68
(1.44)

3.64
(1.39)

3.20
(1.89)

3.16
(1.84)

30

3.03
(1.53)

3.04
(1.53)

2.37
(1.57)

2.35
(1.55)

3.00
(1.92)

2.98
(1.89)

Forgot to start

17

3.31
(1.70)

3.31
(1.70)

2.00
(1.46)

2.00
(1.46)

2.69
(1.96)

2.66
(1.90)

Started but, forgot
to finish

13

2.64
(1.21)

2.64
(1.21)

2.91
(1.64)

2.85
(1.61)

3.45
(1.86)

3.45
(1.86)

11

3.64
(1.29)

3.64
(1.29)

2.45
(1.21)

2.45
(1.21)

3.09
(1.45)

3.09
(1.45)

11

3.64
(1.29)

3.64
(1.29)

2.45
(1.21)

2.45
(1.21)

3.09
(1.45)

3.09
(1.45)

158

3.67
(1.64)

3.50
(1.53)

3.27
(1.51)

3.05
(1.37)

2.65
(1.55)

2.48
(1.42)

Tired

59

3.35
(1.57)

3.29
(1.53)

2.94
(1.50)

2.85
(1.39)

2.51
(1.45)

2.43
(1.35)

Ill

99

3.84
(1.64)

3.68
(1.55)

3.44
(1.48)

3.23
(1.41)

2.69
(1.59)

2.49
(1.52)

Other

103

3.71
(1.99)

3.70
(2.00)

2.96
(1.97)

2.94
(1.95)

3.31
(2.21)

3.28
(2.19)

Prospective Memory
Failures

Attention Failures
Couldn't
Concentrate
Somatic Failures

Note. Mean-A = Mean using average of ratings on days when participants reported more than
1 failure in the same category, Mean-M = Mean using maximum of ratings on days when
participants reported more than 1 failure in the same category. Overall category appears in
italics.
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Table 7
Frequency and impact of memory failures by category and item type

Bother
Mean-A Mean-M
(SD)
(SD) *

Interference
Mean-A Mean-M
(SD)
(SD) *

Consequences
Mean-A Mean-M
(SD)
(SD) *

Frequency

% of all
failures

157

43.85

3.27
(1.88)

3.18
(1.86)

2.55
(1.68)

2.51
(1.68)

2.30
(1.75)

2.24
(1.70)

Put

82

22.91

3.15
(1.85)

--

2.56
(1.63)

--

2.10
(1.58)

--

Date

11

3.07

3.91
(1.76)

--

2.82
(1.66)

--

3.09
(1.92)

--

Directions

10

2.79

3.10
(1.60)

--

2.90
(1.60)

--

2.30
(1.57)

--

Name

54

15.08

2.26
(1.25)

--

1.59
(0.96)

--

1.44
(0.74)

--

Information

22

6.15

4.64
(2.17)

--

3.91
(2.09)

--

4.09
(2.27)

--

Prospective
Memory Failures

130

36.31

3.58
(1.83)

3.54
(1.82)

2.72
(1.76)

2.69
(1.75)

3.24
(1.83)

3.19
(1.80)

Appointment

13

3.63

4.31
(1.49)

--

2.54
(1.66)

--

3.31
(1.70)

--

Errand

30

8.38

3.20
(1.52)

--

2.37
(1.45)

--

2.77
(1.33)

--

Medication

55

15.36

3.81
(1.98)

--

2.89
(1.91)

--

3.44
(1.99)

--

Chore

32

8.94

3.03
(1.77)

--

2.69
(1.71)

--

3.09
(1.91)

--

49

13.69

2.34
(1.74)

--

2.31
(1.77)

--

2.35
(1.64)

--

Retrospective
Memory Failures

Unclassified
Memory Failures
(Other)
Total number of
memory failures

358

Note. Mean-A = Mean using average of ratings on days when participants reported more than
1 failure in the same category, Mean-M = Mean using maximum of ratings on days when
participants reported more than 1 failure in the same category. Overall category appears in
italics. *Participants reported only one failure for forgotten item type and a second mean
using maximum ratings was not required.
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Table 8
Frequency and impact of failures broken down by typicality

Retrospective
Memory Failures

Frequency

Bother
Mean-A Mean-M
(SD)
(SD)

Interference
Mean-A Mean-M
(SD)
(SD)

Consequences
Mean-A Mean-M
(SD)
(SD)

Recently
learned

37

3.00
(1.89)

2.97
(1.90)

2.97
(1.82)

2.94
(1.83)

2.51
(1.72)

2.50
(1.70)

Well-known

60

3.09
(1.87)

3.06
(1.84)

1.98
(1.48)

1.98
(1.48)

2.16
(1.84)

2.11
(1.74)

Bother
Mean-A
(SD)

Mean-M
(SD)

Prospective
Memory Failures

Frequency

Interference
Mean-A Mean-M
(SD)
(SD)

Consequences
Mean-A Mean-M
(SD)
(SD)

Routine

93

3.71
(1.93)

3.64
(1.90)

2.95
(1.89)

2.90
(1.86)

3.47
(1.95)

3.37
(1.92)

Not routine

67

3.31
(1.58)

3.27
(1.58)

2.27
(1.38)

2.23
(1.36)

2.87
(1.60)

2.86
(1.59)

Overload
Failures

Frequency

Bother
Mean-A Mean-M
(SD)
(SD)

Interference
Mean-A Mean-M
(SD)
(SD)

Consequences
Mean-A Mean-M
(SD)
(SD)

Routine

128

3.19
(1.53)

3.08
(1.46)

3.03
(1.59)

2.91
(1.55)

2.77
(1.67)

2.68
(1.59)

Not routine

197

2.99
(1.64)

2.88
(1.58)

2.27
(1.33)

2.20
(1.29)

2.52
(1.60)

2.41
(1.50)

Somatic Failures

Frequency

Bother
Mean-A Mean-M
(SD)
(SD)

Interference
Mean-A Mean-M
(SD)
(SD)

Consequences
Mean-A Mean-M
(SD)
(SD)

Routine

97

3.90
(1.59)

3.71
(1.48)

3.39
(1.48)

3.23
(1.35)

2.66
(1.62)

2.54
(1.48)

Not routine

62

3.17
(1.62)

3.13
(1.62)

2.85
(1.49)

2.80
(1.49)

2.33
(1.40)

2.31
(1.38)

Note. Mean-A = Mean using average of ratings on days when participants reported more than
1 failure in the same category, Mean-M = Mean using maximum of ratings on days when
participants reported more than 1 failure in the same category. Overall category appears in
italics.
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Table 9
Estimated ratings of impact by age
Bother
Young
Old

Interference
Young
Old

Consequences
Young
Old

M (SE)
2.78
(0.47)

M (SE)
1.88
(0.42)

M (SE)
2.61
(0.47)

M (SE)
2.05
(0.41)

M (SE)
2.44
(0.46)

M (SE)
1.92
(0.41)

Prospective
Memory Failures

2.99
(0.51)

2.01
(0.44)

2.66
(0.50)

1.69
(0.43)

2.78
(0.50)

2.16
(0.44)

Retrospective
Memory Failures

2.96
(0.54)

2.09
(0.43)

2.47
(0.52)

1.63
(0.42)

2.10
(0.54)

1.33
(0.42)

Somatic Failures

3.03
(0.52)

2.13
(0.48)

2.81
(0.50)

2.30
(0.46)

2.46
(0.51)

1.56
(0.47)

Overload Failures

Note. Model estimated means for each category of failures. Young = 1 SD below the mean in
age (~30 years old), Old = 1 SD above the mean in age (~65 years old)
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Table 10
Model based estimates of impact by failure typicality and age

Retrospective
Memory Failures

Bother
Young
Old

Interference
Young
Old

Consequences
Young
Old

M (SE)

M (SE)

M (SE)

a

M (SE)
a

M (SE)

h

h,j

k

M (SE)

Recently Learned

2.88
(1.20)

1.50
(0.97)

3.12
(0.92)

2.04
(0.75)

2.68
(0.98)

1.51k
(0.79)

Well-known

2.96b
(1.24)

1.92b
(0.92)

2.18i
(0.95)

1.07i,j
(0.71)

2.12l
(1.01)

1.35l
(0.75)

Bother
Young
Old

Interference
Young
Old

Consequences
Young
Old

M (SE)

M (SE)

M (SE)

M (SE)

M (SE)

M (SE)

Routine

2.05
(0.78)

1.85
(0.70)

1.85
(0.75)

0.98
(0.67)

1.78
(0.77)

1.50
(0.69)

Not routine

2.57
(0.83)

1.40
(0.69)

0.95
(0.79)

0.83
(0.66)

1.87
(0.81)

1.28
(0.68)

Prospective
Memory Failures

Overload Failures

Bother
Young
Old

Interference
Young
Old

Consequences
Young
Old

M (SE)

M (SE)

M (SE)

M (SE)

M (SE)

c

M (SE)
c

Routine

2.15
(0.60)

1.46
(0.54)

2.03
(0.57)

1.71
(0.52)

2.35
(0.62)

2.26
(0.56)

Not routine

2.16d
(0.57)

1.38d
(0.50)

1.50
(0.54)

1.17
(0.48)

2.57
(0.58)

1.82
(0.52)

Somatic Failures

Bother
Young
Old

Interference
Young
Old

Consequences
Young
Old

M (SE)

M (SE)

M (SE)

e

M (SE)
e,g

M (SE)

m

M (SE)

Routine

4.01
(0.78)

3.39
(0.76)

3.63
(0.70)

2.97
(0.70)

3.56
(0.71)

2.56m,o
(0.71)

Not routine

3.92f
(0.80)

2.73f,g
(0.72)

3.33
(0.73)

2.77
(0.63)

3.12n
(0.75)

2.34n,o
(0.65)

Note. Model estimated means for each category of failures. Young = 1 SD below the mean in
age (~30 years old), Old = 1 SD above the mean in age (~65 years old). Means with the same
subscript are significantly different from one another.
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Table 11
Intraclass correlations for cognitive interference items and total score
Item
1. Think about personal worries?

ICC
0.65

2. Think about something you didn’t mean
to think about?
3. Have trouble concentrating?

0.64

4. Have thoughts that kept jumping into your
head?
5. Try to avoid certain thoughts?
6. I have thoughts that you could not stop?
7. Try to put problems out of your mind?

0.63

8. Do things to distract yourself from your
thoughts?

0.66

9. Stay busy just to keep thoughts from
entering your mind?

0.68

Total score

0.77

Note. ICC = Intraclass Correlation

0.63

0.62
0.64
0.61
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Table 12
Generalizability theory variance decomposition models
Source
Person
Day
Item
Person*Day
Person*Item
Day*Item
Error
Total

Fixed
1.11
0.00
0.06
0.30
0.20
0.00
0.49
2.15

%
51.41
0.09
2.57
14.15
9.21
0.03
22.53

Random
1.11
0.00
0.06
0.30
0.20
0.00
0.48
2.15

%
51.41
0.08
2.57
14.16
9.20
0.08
22.51

Note. The fixed column refers to constraining factors in the G-theory model to be fixed. The
random column refers to allowing factors in the G-theory model to be random.
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Table 13
Factor loadings and eigenvalues for multilevel exploratory factor analysis
Between
Factor
0.865

Within
Factor 1
0.574

Within
Factor 2
0.378

2. Think about something you
didn’t mean to think about?
3. Have trouble concentrating?

0.938
0.815

0.712
0.580

0.370
0.264

4. Have thoughts that kept jumping
into your head?
5. Try to avoid certain thoughts?

0.951
0.976

0.752
0.596

0.423
0.592

6. I have thoughts that you could
not stop?

0.972

0.624

0.480

7. Try to put problems out of your
mind?

0.978

0.427

0.674

8. Do things to distract yourself
from your thoughts?

0.963

0.441

0.798

9. Stay busy just to keep thoughts
from entering your mind?
Eigenvalue for factor

0.924
7.845

0.354
4.016

0.706
1.166

Item
1. Think about personal worries?

Note. Loading for items that were later constrained to be on that factor are in bold. Item 5,
which loads highly on both within-person factors, is in italics.
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Table 14
Model fits for multilevel confirmatory factor analysis models examining cognitive interference and negative affect

Evening NA

Model Fits
Chisquare
df
p-value
TLI
RMSEA
Correlations
Between
NA and
CI
Within
NA and
Intrusions
NA and
Control
Intrusions
and
Control

Beep 1 NA

Beep 2 NA

Beep 3 NA

Beep 4 NA

Beep 5 NA

1 Factor
Model

2 Factor
Model

1 Factor
Model

2 Factor
Model

1 Factor
Model*

2 Factor
Model

1 Factor
Model

2 Factor
Model*

1 Factor
Model

2 Factor
Model

1 Factor
Model

2 Factor
Model*

1212.5
130
<.001
0.60
0.10

334.2
126
<.001
0.92
0.05

1647.3
130
<.001
0.38
0.12

297.3
126
<.001
0.93
0.04

1767.9
131
<.001
0.35
0.12

329.1
126
<.001
0.92
0.04

1526.1
130
<.001
0.39
0.11

305.9
127
<.001
0.93
0.04

4063.0
130
<.001
-0.65
0.19

357.4
126
<.001
0.91
0.04

1803.1
131
<.001
0.35
0.12

325.5
127
<.001
0.93
0.04

--

.69

--

.68

--

.65

--

.74

--

.61

--

.75

--

.54

--

.22

--

.23

--

.28

--

.39

--

.23

--

.39

--

.12

--

.23

--

.30

--

.21

--

.20

--

.68

--

.69

--

.69

--

.69

--

.69

--

.69

Note. Correlations cannot be computed for 1 factor models. *These models required an additional constraint for model estimation. The
negative affect item 3 (upset) had a negative residual that was constrained to be a small value (.001). CI = cognitive interference, NA =
negative affect, RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation, TLI = Tucker Lewis Fit Index.
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Table 15
Correlations among cognitive tasks
1
1. Backward
Letter Span
2. Subtract 2
Span
3. LetterNumber
Sequencing
4. Card
Location
Memory
5. AVLT List
Memory
6. Paired
Associates
7. Ravens
8. Letter Series
Mean
SD
Skew
Kurtosis

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

.31
.39
7.59
6.22
1.04
0.41

.59
20.96
5.42
-0.97
0.24

12.38
5.29
-0.07
-0.64

-.48
.44

.44

-.03

-.12

-.02

.08

.11

.18

.26

.16

.10

.29

.39

.41

.35
.35
9.38
8.00
1.25
1.23

.36
.37
15.66
11.15
0.94
1.15

.46
.43
10.33
2.20
-0.09
0.81

.13
.25
11.47
3.40
0.34
0.23

.29
.35
8.71
2.51
0.10
-0.27

Note. Correlations in bold significant at p < .05. Correlations in boxes represent the three
constructs working memory, episodic memory, and fluid intelligence.
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Table 16
Factor analysis results for cognitive tasks
Task

Factor 1
0.650

Factor 2
0.024

Factor 3
0.100

2. Subtract 2 Span

0.692

-0.048

0.125

3. Letter-Number Sequencing

0.643

0.159

0.186

4. Card Location Memory

-0.172

0.442

0.278

5. AVLT List Memory

0.097

0.404

0.303

6. Paired Associates
7. Ravens
8. Letter Series
Eigenvalue

0.206
0.475
0.418
14.676

0.939
0.200
0.291
3.899

0.053
0.510
0.663
1.032

Factor 1
0.211
0.453

Factor 2

1. Backward Letter Span

Inter-factor correlations
Factor 2
Factor 3

0.338
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Table 17
Correlations among cognitive composite scores and cognitive failures
Prospective
Memory
Failures

Retrospective
Overload Somatic
Memory
Failures Failures
Failures

Working Memory
Composite Scores

-.02

.02

.22*

-.16†

Episodic Memory
Composite Scores

-.02

-.26*

-.07

-.16†

Fluid Intelligence
Composite Scores

-.08

-.16†

.04

-.08

Note. * p < .05, † p< .10. Frequency correlations used frequency of failures adjusted for
number of days the evening survey was correctly completed to control for reporting
biases. Frequency correlations were calculated using Spearman correlations.
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Table 18
Correlations among cognitive interference and cognitive performance composite scores
Cognitive
Interference Total
Score

Intrusions
Subscale
Score

Thought
Control
Subscale Score

Working Memory
Composite Scores

-.11

-.07

-.15†

Episodic Memory
Composite Scores

.18*

.19*

.15†

Fluid Intelligence
Composite Scores

-.04

.03

-.12

Note. * p < .05, † p< .10.
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Table 19
Model estimated means of cognitive interference at different levels of cognitive
performance
Working Memory
Low
Average
High

Episodic Memory
Low
Average
High

Fluid Intelligence
Low
Average
High

M (SE)

M (SE)

M (SE)

M (SE)

M (SE)

M (SE)

M (SE)

M (SE)

M (SE)

Cognitive
Interference
Total Score

21.57
(0.94)

21.11
(0.87)

20.66
(0.94)

20.33
(0.94)

21.11
(0.86)

21.89
(0.94)

21.35
(1.00)

21.11
(0.87)

20.87
(1.00)

Intrusion
Subscale Score

11.97
(0.52)

11.82
(0.48)

11.67
(0.52)

11.36
(0.51)

11.82
(0.47)

12.28
(0.51)

11.73
(0.55)

11.82
(0.48)

11.91
(0.55)

Control
Subscale Score

9.59
(0.45)

9.29
(0.41)

8.99
(0.45)

8.97
(0.45)

9.29
(0.41)

9.61
(0.45)

9.62
(0.48)

9.29
(0.42)

8.96
(0.48)

Note. SE = standard estimate, Low = individuals performing at 1 standard deviation
below the mean, Average = individuals performing at the mean, High = individuals
performing at 1 standard deviation above the mean.
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Table 20
Cognitive interference differences across age
Young

Old

M (SE)

M (SE)

Cognitive
Interference
Total Score

23.79
(1.17)

18.53
(0.84)

Intrusion
Subscale Score

13.30
(0.64)

10.39
(0.63)

Control
Subscale Score

10.48
(0.56)

8.14
(0.55)

Note. SE = standard estimate, Young = 1 SD below the mean in age (~30 years old), Old
= 1 SD above the mean in age (~65 years old).
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Table 21
Model based estimates of cognitive interference for different levels of episodic memory
performance across age
Young
Low
High
EM
EM

Old
Low
EM

High
EM

M (SE)

M (SE)

M (SE)

M (SE)

Cognitive
Interference
Total Score

21.70
(1.34)

23.01
(1.03)

19.53
(1.01)

18.30
(1.46)

Intrusion
Subscale Score

12.04
(0.74)

12.88
(0.57)

10.91
(0.56)

10.26
(0.81)

Control
Subscale Score

9.66
(0.65)

10.14
(0.50)

8.62
(0.49)

8.04
(0.71)

Note. EM = Episodic memory, SE = Standard estimate.
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Table 22
Descriptive statistics for trait cognitive interference measures
Measure
Thought Occurrence
Questionnaire
Thought Control
Questionnaire (Worry
Subscale)
Thought Control
Questionnaire
(Punishment Subscale)
White Bear Suppression
Inventory
Impact of Events Scale

N

Mean

SD

Min

Max

131

29.05

5.64

17

51

131

9.63

3.09

6

24

130

7.78

2.21

6

16

130

46.96

12.32

15

70

129

34.88

10.33

15

56

Note. Differences in sample size are due to participants refusing to complete certain items
on the questionnaires.
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Table 23
Estimates relating trait cognitive interference and daily cognitive interference
Cognitive Interference
Estimate
SE

Intrusions
Estimate
SE

Control
Estimate
SE

Thought Occurrence
Questionnaire

4.03

0.84

2.08

0.47

1.94

0.41

Impact of Events
Scale

2.59

0.80

1.36

0.44

1.22

0.39

White Bear
Suppression
Inventory

3.93

0.81

1.94

0.46

1.99

0.39

Thought Control
Questionnaire Punishment Subscale

2.79

0.80

1.38

0.45

1.41

0.39

Thought Control
Questionnaire Worry Subscale

2.25

0.89

1.17

0.50

1.08

0.44

Note. All estimates significant at p < .05.
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Table 24
Correlations among reasons for missed daily activities

Overload Failures

Overload
Failures

Prospective
Memory
Attention
Failures
Somatic
Failures

Prospective Memory

Interrupted

Interrupted

Out of
Time
.30

Something
more
important
came up

Something
more important
came up
Avoided it
Too difficult
Forgot to start

.27
-.01
.07
.13

.13
.14
-.01
.11

.09
.10
.07

.05
.20

-.02

Started but
forgot to finish

.14

.33

.10

.03

.05

.25

Couldn't
concentrate
Too tired
Ill

-.13
.05
-.11

.11
.24
.09

.04
.09
.16

.20
.09
-.05

.22
.06
.20

-.10
-.15
-.03

Note. Bolded correlations are significant, p ≤ .05.

Avoided
Too
it
difficult

Forgot
to start

Attention
Failures

Started but
forgot to
Couldn't
finish
concentrate

.03
.23
.02

.09
.04

Somatic
Failures

Too
tired

.22
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Table 25
Correlations among memory failure items

Prospective Memory

Retrospective Memory

Retrospective
Memory

Prospective
Memory

Date
Directions
Name
Information

Put
something
.02
.18
.27
.17

Appointment
Errand
Medication
Chore
Unclassified

-.05
.06
.13
-.07
.11

Date

Directions

.15
.14
.13

.27
.19

.21

.06
.23
.06
.04
-.06

.04
.18
-.02
-.06
.05

.21
.16
.02
.02
.16

Note. Bolded correlations are significant, p ≤ .05.

Name Information Appointment Errand Medication Chore

.16
.28
.04
-.02
.12

.14
-.05
.36
.05

.08
-.03
.04

.17
.17

.15
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Figure 1
Eigenvalues for Multilevel Exploratory Factor Analysis

Eigenvalues for Multilevel Exploratory Factor Analysis
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Equations
Equation 1. Between-person reliability (fixed effects model)
Equation 2. Within-person reliability (fixed effects model)
Equation 3. Between-person reliability (random effects model)
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σ2person + [σ2person*item/m]
(1)

rbp =
2

σ

person +

2

[σ

person*item/m]

2

+ [σ

error/m]

σ2person*time
rwp =

[σ2person*time] + [σ2error/m]

(2)

σ2person + [σ2person*item/m]
rbp =

(3)

σ2person + [σ2person*item/m] + σ2time + σ2person*time + [σ2error/m]
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Appendix F
Beeped Schedules

5am Profile: This alarm schedule is used for participants who report typically waking up on
weekdays between 4:00 am and 5:00 am.
Sunday
6:45 am
9:05 am
11:30 am
2:25 pm
5:15 pm

Monday
6:15 am
8:50 am
11:05 am
1:50 pm
4:25 pm

Tuesday
7:25 am
9:30 am
12:25 pm
3:05 pm
5:45 pm

Wednesday
5:55 am
8:25 am
10:55 am
1:30 pm
4:10 pm

Thursday
7:00 am
9:10 am
12:05 pm
2:55 pm
5:40 pm

Friday
6:40 am
8:55 am
11:10 am
2:00 pm
4:35 pm

Saturday
7:40 am
10:10 am
12:35 pm
3:20 pm
5:55 pm

6am Profile: This alarm schedule is used for participants who report typically waking up on
weekdays between 5:01 am and 6:00 am.
Sunday
7:45 am
10:05 am
12:30 pm
3:25 pm
6:15 pm

Monday
7:15 am
9:50 am
12:05 pm
2:50 pm
5:25 pm

Tuesday
8:25 am
10:30 am
1:25 pm
4:05 pm
6:45 pm

Wednesday
6:55 am
9:25 am
11:55 am
2:30 pm
5:10 pm

Thursday
8:00 am
10:10 am
1:05 pm
3:55 pm
6:40 pm

Friday
7:40 am
9:55 am
12:10 pm
3:00 pm
5:35 pm

Saturday
8:40 am
11:10 am
1:35 pm
4:20 pm
6:55 pm

7am Profile: This alarm schedule is used for participants who report typically waking up on
weekdays between 6:01 am and 7:00 am.
Sunday
8:45 am
11:05 am
1:30 pm
4:25 pm
7:15 pm

Monday
8:15 am
10:50 am
1:05 pm
3:50 pm
6:25 pm

Tuesday
9:25 am
11:30 am
2:25 pm
5:05 pm
7:45 pm

Wednesday
7:55 am
10:25 am
12:55 pm
3:30 pm
6:10 pm

Thursday
9:00 am
11:10 am
2:05 pm
4:55 pm
7:40 pm

Friday
8:40 am
10:55 am
1:10 pm
4:00 pm
6:35 pm

Saturday
9:40 am
12:10 pm
2:35 pm
5:20 pm
7:55 pm

8am Profile: This alarm schedule is used for participants who report typically waking up on
weekdays between 7:01 am and 8:00 am.
Sunday
9:45 am
12:05 pm
2:30 pm
5:25 pm
8:15 pm

Monday
9:15 am
11:50 am
2:05 pm
4:50 pm
7:25 pm

Tuesday
10:25 am
12:30 pm
3:25 pm
6:05 pm
8:45 pm

Wednesday
8:55 am
11:25 am
1:55 pm
4:30 pm
7:10 pm

Thursday
10:00 am
12:10 pm
3:05 pm
5:55 pm
8:40 pm

Friday
9:40 am
11:55 am
2:10 pm
5:00 pm
7:35 pm

Saturday
10:40 am
1:10 pm
3:35 pm
6:20 pm
8:55 pm

9am Profile: This alarm schedule is used for participants who report typically waking up on
weekdays between 8:01 am and 9:00 am.
Sunday
10:45 am
1:05 pm
3:30 pm
6:25 pm
9:15 pm

Monday
10:15 am
12:50 pm
3:05 pm
5:50 pm
8:25 pm

Tuesday
11:25 am
1:30 pm
4:25 pm
7:05 pm
9:45 pm

Wednesday
9:55 am
12:25 pm
2:55 pm
5:30 pm
8:10 pm

Thursday
11:00 am
1:10 pm
4:05 pm
6:55 pm
9:40 pm

Friday
10:40 am
12:55 pm
3:10 pm
6:00 pm
8:35 pm

Saturday
11:40 am
2:10 pm
4:35 pm
7:20 pm
9:55 pm

10am Profile: This alarm schedule is used for participants who report typically waking up on
weekdays between 9:01 am and 10:00 am.
Sunday
11:45 am
2:05 pm
4:30 pm
7:25 pm
10:15 pm

Monday
11:15 am
1:50 pm
4:05 pm
6:50 pm
9:25 pm

Tuesday
12:25 pm
2:30 pm
5:25 pm
8:05 pm
10:45 pm

Wednesday
10:55 am
1:25 pm
3:55 pm
6:30 pm
9:10 pm

Thursday
12:00 pm
2:10 pm
5:05 pm
7:55 pm
10:40 pm

Friday
11:40 am
1:55 pm
4:10 pm
7:00 pm
9:35 pm

Saturday
12:40 pm
3:10 pm
5:35 pm
8:20 pm
10:55 pm

11am Profile: This alarm schedule is used for participants who report typically waking up on
weekdays between 10:01 am and 11:00 am.
Sunday
12:45 pm
3:05 pm
5:30 pm
8:25 pm
11:15 pm

Monday
12:15 pm
2:50 pm
5:05 pm
7:50 pm
10:25 pm

Tuesday
1:25 pm
3:30 pm
6:25 pm
9:05 pm
11:45 pm

Wednesday
11:55 am
2:25 pm
4:55 pm
7:30 pm
10:10 pm

Thursday
1:00 pm
3:10 pm
6:05 pm
8:55 pm
11:40 pm

Friday
12:40 pm
2:55 pm
5:10 pm
8:00 pm
10:35 pm

Saturday
1:40 pm
4:10 pm
6:35 pm
9:20 pm
11:55 pm

The schedules above must be entered into Palm Desktop so that they can then be downloaded to
individual palmtop computers. Signals are scheduled by creating “Profiles” in the calendar on
Palm Desktop. A profile is used to schedule the beeps because it can be downloaded to many
different PDAs with different ID numbers. Creating a profile is similar to creating a Palm ID
number (as you did in Section 2.1), but the specific procedures are slightly different. Below are
instructions for creating the profiles needed for CHAP:
1. Open Palm Desktop on the computer by clicking on the Palm Desktop icon on the
computer desktop or by going to Start  All Programs  Palm Desktop.
2. In the top right corner of the screen, click the drop down menu next to “User” (A
in Figure 2.1) and select “Edit users…”
3. Click on the “Profiles” button on the right of the Users screen (see Figure 2.4). A
window will open that lists all of the profiles you create.
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Appendix G
Missed Activities Checklist
Memory Failures Checklist
Cognitive Interference Questionnaire
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Uncompleted Activities:

The next several questions ask about things that you wanted to do today.
Which of these things did you want to accomplish today but were unable to complete?
(check all that apply)
Meet/talk with some
Self-care task
Leisure activity
Household chores
Physical activity
Other
School task
None of the above
Work task
For each category selected:
Why did you not [insert name of activity]?
Ran out of time
Something more important came up
Was interrupted
Started, but forgot to finish
Forgot to start it
Decided to avoid it
Not feeling well
It was too difficult
Couldn’t concentrate
Other
Too tired
Follow-up questions for each activity selected:
Question
How much does not [insert name of
activity] bother you now?
How much did not doing this interfere with
your daily routine?
Do you think not [insert name of activity]
will have consequences beyond today?
Is this activity part of your daily routine?

Response Options
1= not at all, 7=very much
1= not at all, 7=very much
1= not at all, 7=very much
1= not at all, 7=very much
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Memory Failures:
During the day today, which of the following things did you forget?
(Mark all that apply)
Taking medicine
Directions
An errand
Appointment
Household chore
Personal date
Where you put something
A name
Important information
Other
None of the above
For each category selected:
Question
How much does forgetting [insert name of
task] bother you now?
How much did forgetting interfere with your
schedule?
Do you think forgetting [insert name of task]
will have consequences beyond today?
Is [insert name of task] part of your daily
routine?
* for medication, errand, appointment, chore
Is this [insert name of task] something you:
* for important information, directions,
personal date, name, location

Response Options
1= not at all, 7=very much
1= not at all, 7=very much
1= not at all, 7=very much
1= not at all, 7=very much
just recently learned, have known for a
while
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Strategy Use:
On the next few pages are different things people do to try to remember.
How often did you do each of these things TODAY?
Question
TODAY, did you:
Make lists of things you needed to do?
Write yourself reminder notes?
Keep an appointment book updated in
order to remember to do things?
Plan your daily schedule in advance so you
would not forget things?
Have someone else remind you to do
things?
Rehearse things in your mind so you would
not forget to do them?

Response Options

yes, no
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On the next several pages are statements that describe different thoughts that people
sometimes have. For each one, choose the response that best describes the thoughts you
had TODAY.
Today, how often did you:
Questions
Think about personal worries?
Think about something you didn’t mean to
think about?
Have trouble concentrating?
Have thoughts that kept jumping into your
head?
Try to avoid certain thoughts?
I have thoughts that you could not stop?
Try to put problems out of your mind?
Do things to distract yourself from your
thoughts?
Stay busy just to keep thoughts from
entering your mind?

Response Options

1=none, 4=a few times, 7=very often
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Appendix H
Ecological Momentary Assessment Questions
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Stress (beeped assessment):
The next several pages are going to ask questions about stressful events or experiences
SINCE THE LAST ASSESSMENT.
Did anything stressful occur since the last assessment? (yes/no)
If they report that something stressful has occurred:
Which of the following types of stressors have you experienced since the last
assessment?
Argument/disagreement/conflict Health or accident
Work/school related event
Event that happened to others
Home related event
Other stressor

Which specific type(s) of [insert name of stressor category here] did you
experience? (select all that apply)
Argument/disagreement/conflict
General disagreement
Value differences
Work related
Family issues
Financial issues
Other
Miscommunication
Work/education
Work overload/demand
Mistakes

Job security
Technical breakdown

Home
Home overload/demand
Pet event
Health/accident
Accident
Illness

Home or car repairs
Neighborhood concerns

Visit/contact with
healthcare provider

Events that happen to others
Others’ health or medical problems
Financial problems

Other

Financial concerns
Other

Other

Social concerns
Other

Other
Traffic or transportation
News
For each category of stressors:

Weather
Mistakes

Other
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How stressful or unpleasant was this
[insert category name] when it occurred?
How stressful or unpleasant is it now?
Is this [insert category name] resolved?
How much have you thought about it since
it happened?
How much have you tried to stop thinking
about this [insert category name] since it
happened?

1=not at all, 7=extremely
1=not at all, 7=extremely
yes, no
1=not at all, 7=a great deal
1=not at all, 7=a great deal

If they report that nothing stressful occurred since last assessment:
On the next page is a list of some experiences. Which of these happened to you
(even if you did not find them stressful), SINCE THE LAST ASSESSMENT?
Which of these happened to you since the last assessment? (mark all that apply)
Argument, disagreement or conflict
Difficulties involving work/school
Difficulties at home

Health issue or accident
A negative event that happened to others
None of the above

For each category selected:
How unpleasant was this [insert category
name] when it occurred?
How unpleasant is it now?
Is this [insert category name] resolved?

1= not at all, 7= extremely
1= not at all, 7= extremely
yes, no

If “none of the above” is selected:
Why do you think nothing stressful happened to you since the last assessment?
I just got lucky.
Another reason
Stressful things don’t usually happen to
me.
I avoided stressful situations.
I handled situations before they became
stressful.

Anticipating future stress:
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Do you think that you will have anything STRESSFUL happen in the next few hours?
Response Options: yes/no
If yes: How unpleasant or stressful do you expect it to be? (1= not at all, 7=
extremely)
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Affect (beeped assessment):
On the following pages are descriptions of feelings. Rate how you feel right now.
Question
Response Options
Which of these best describes how you feel right now?
1=sleepy, 7=active/alert
Which of these best describes how you feel right now?

1=unpleasant, 7=pleasant

Which of these best describes how you feel right now?
Which of these best describes how you feel right now?

1=depressed, 7=excited
1=relaxed, 7= stressed

Question

Response Options

How happy do you feel right now?

1=not at all happy, 4=moderately,
7=extremely happy

How tense do you feel right now?

1=not at all tense, 4=moderately,
7=extremely tense

How enthusiastic do you feel right now?

1=not at all enthusiastic, 4=moderately,
7=extremely enthusiastic

How sad do you feel right now?

1=not at all sad, 4=moderately,
7=extremely sad

How content do you feel right now?

1=not at all content, 4=moderately,
7=extremely content

How upset do you feel right now?

1=not at all upset, 4=moderately,
7=extremely upset

How excited do you feel right now?

1=not at all excited, 4=moderately,
7=extremely excited

How disappointed do you feel right now?

1=not at all disappointed, 4=moderately,
7=extremely disappointed
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Affect (waking assessment):
On the following pages are descriptions of feelings. Rate how you feel right now.
Question
Response Options
Which of these best describes how you think you will
1=sleepy, 7=active/alert
feel today?
Which of these best describes how you think you will
1=unpleasant, 7=pleasant
feel today?
Which of these best describes how you think you will
1=depressed, 7=excited
feel today?
Which of these best describes how you think you will
1=relaxed, 7= stressed
feel today?

Question

Response Options

How happy do you think you will feel
today?

1=not at all happy, 4=moderately,
7=extremely happy

How tense do you think you will feel
today?

1=not at all tense, 4=moderately,
7=extremely tense

How enthusiastic do you think you will feel 1=not at all enthusiastic, 4=moderately,
today?
7=extremely enthusiastic
How sad do you think you will feel today?

1=not at all sad, 4=moderately,
7=extremely sad

How content do you think you will feel
today?

1=not at all content, 4=moderately,
7=extremely content

How upset do you think you will feel
today?

1=not at all upset, 4=moderately,
7=extremely upset

How excited do you think you will feel
today?

1=not at all excited, 4=moderately,
7=extremely excited

How disappointed do you think you will
feel today?

1=not at all disappointed, 4=moderately,
7=extremely disappointed
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Affect (bedtime assessment):
On the following pages are descriptions of feelings. Rate how you feel right now.
Question
Response Options
Which of these best describes how you felt in general
1=sleepy, 7=active/alert
during the day today?
Which of these best describes how you felt in general
1=unpleasant, 7=pleasant
during the day today?
Which of these best describes how you felt in general
1=depressed, 7=excited
during the day today?
Which of these best describes how you felt in general
1=relaxed, 7= stressed
during the day today?

Question

Response Options

How happy did you feel today?

1=not at all happy, 4=moderately,
7=extremely happy

How tense did you feel today?

1=not at all tense, 4=moderately,
7=extremely tense

How enthusiastic did you feel today?

1=not at all enthusiastic, 4=moderately,
7=extremely enthusiastic

How sad did you feel today?

1=not at all sad, 4=moderately,
7=extremely sad

How content did you feel today?

1=not at all content, 4=moderately,
7=extremely content

How upset did you feel today?

1=not at all upset, 4=moderately,
7=extremely upset

How excited did you feel today?

1=not at all excited, 4=moderately,
7=extremely excited

How disappointed did you feel today?

1=not at all disappointed, 4=moderately,
7=extremely disappointed
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Physical Symptoms (beeped assessment):
The next several pages are going to ask questions about your physical activities and
symptoms since the last assessment.
Question
Response Options
Overall, how have you felt physically since 1=extremely unhealthy, 7=extremely
the last assessment?
healthy
How much did physical symptoms interfere
with your daily routine or restrict your
0=not at all, 3=moderately, 6=extremely
activities since the last assessment?
Physical Symptoms (bedtime assessment):
Question
Which symptoms did you have today?
(Mark all that apply.)

Responses
Headache
Backache
Joint pain
Dizziness
Nausea
Allergy symptoms
Poor appetite
Congestion
Sore throat
Muscle soreness
Menstrual pain
Cold/flu
Chest pain or tightness
Constipation or diarrhea
Trouble breathing
Heart pounding
Hot/cold flashes
Trembling or shaking
Other symptom
None of these symptoms

For each selected physical symptom:
Question
What do you think caused [physical
symptom]?

Responses
Chronic illness
Acute illness
Exercise
Poor self-care
Diet or food
Alcohol
Aging
Stress
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How much did it interfere with or restrict
your daily activities during the day today?
How often did you have [physical
symptom] today?
Overall, how bad was your [physical
symptom] today?

Reproductive issues
Medication/side effects
Injury
Other cause
1 = not at all to 7 = extremely
1 = rarely to 7 = all day
1 = not at all to 7 = extremely
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Sleep Quality (waking assessment):
Question
Response Format and Options
When did you go to bed last night (that is,
separate drop down menus for hours and
get into bed with the intention of sleeping)? minutes
drop down menus with the options less
How long did it take you to fall asleep last
than 15 mins, 15-30 mins, 31-60 mins,
night?
more than 60 mins
When did you get up this morning?
separate drop down menus for hours and
minutes
How many hours of actual sleep did you
drop down menu with the options more
get last night? (this may be different than
than 7, 6-7 hours, 5-6 hours, less than 5
the number of hours you spent in bed)
hours
Last night, how many times did you have
trouble sleeping because you:
Woke up in the middle of the night or early
morning?
Had to get up to use the bathroom?
Could not breathe comfortably?
Coughed or snored loudly?
Felt too cold?
Felt too hot?
Had bad dreams?
Had pain?
Had other thing(s) disturbing sleep?
Last night, did you take medicine
(prescribed or over the counter) to help you
sleep?
Overall, how would you rate your sleep
quality last night?

drop down menu with the options 0 times,
1 time, 2 times, 3+ times

yes/no
1=very good, 4=very bad
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Current Activity (beeped assessment):
Question
What were you doing when you were
beeped?

Where were you doing this activity?

Responses
Chores
Daily self-care
Eating/drinking/smoking
Physical activity
Recreational
School related
Work related
Home
Work
School
Other person’s home
Community center
Religious center
Restaurant/bar
Vehicle
Outside
Medical office
Other
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All Social Interactions (beeped assessment):
Question
Since the last assessment how many social
interactions have you had?
Overall, how often were these interactions
pleasant or positive?
Overall, how often were these interactions
unpleasant or negative?
Overall, how often were these interactions
with a person or people important to you?
Overall, how often were these interactions
about topics that were important or
meaningful to you?

Responses
0-10 or more
1 = none of the time to 7 = all of the time
1 = none of the time to 7 = all of the time
1 = none of the time to 7 = all of the time
1 = none of the time to 7 = all of the time

Most Recent Social Interaction (beeped assessment):
Question
Who was this interaction with?

Overall, how important are the people or
person to you?
How important or meaningful was this
interaction to you?
Overall, how pleasant or positive was this
interaction?
Overall, how unpleasant or negative was
this interaction?

Responses
Spouse/partner
Children
Parent
Sibling
Other family member
Acquaintance
Stranger
Friend
Roommate
Coworker
Classmate
Therapist
Healthcare practitioner
Other
1 = not at all to 7 = extremely
1 = not at all to 7 = extremely
1 = not at all to 7 = extremely
1 = not at all to 7 = extremely
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Question
Right now, are you with other people?
Approximately how many people are you
with now?

Who are you with now?

Responses
Yes, no
1 person
2-3 people
4-10 people
11-25 people
More than 25 people
Spouse/partner
Children
Parent
Sibling
Other family member
Acquaintance
Stranger
Friend
Roommate
Coworker
Classmate
Therapist
Healthcare practitioner
Other
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Functioning (bedtime assessment):
Question
Today, how many times did you have
trouble staying awake while driving, eating
meals, working, or engaging in social
activities?
Today, how many times was it a problem
for you to keep up enthusiasm to get things
done?

Responses
0 times
1 time
2 times
3 or more
0 times
1 time
2 times
3 or more

